The Cyprus Question

TheCyprus Question a brief introduction June 2024

Editorial supervision: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus Ninth edition updates: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus Original text: Van Coufoudakis, Miltos Miltiadou The sale or other commercial exploitation of this publication or part of it is strictly prohibited. Excerpts from the publication may be reproduced with appropriate acknowledgment of this publication as the source of the material used. Press and Information Office publications are available free of charge.

Ninth edition June 2024 a brief introduction TheCyprus Question

Contents FOREWORD 18 INTRODUCTION 19 POLITICAL OVERVIEW 11 Seeking a negotiated solution 11 Issues under discussion since 1974 12 UN negotiations, 2002–2004 13 The 24 April 2004 referenda–the people’s decision 14 Alleged Turkish Cypriot isolation 16 Reviving the peace process 2005–2006 17 The 8th July 2006 agreements 18 New initiatives in 2008 yield results 19 Negotiations leading to Crans Montana 20 Cyprus and the European Union 22 Conclusion 25 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 26 From Independence to the Turkish invasion, 1960–1974 26 Turkish military invasion and occupation 29 Our vision for a reunified Cyprus 37 MAPS 38 APPENDICES 41 1. Policy initiatives for Turkish Cypriots 41 2. Important legal decisions on the Cyprus question 44 3. Consequences of the Turkish invasion and occupation - facts and figures 49 CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS 50 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 57

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The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 5 … if the purpose of a settlement of the Cyprus question is to be the preservation rather than the destruction of the state and if it is to foster rather than to militate against the development of a peacefully united people, I cannot help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from the majority should not be considered a desperate step in the wrong direction.” Dr Galo Plaza, Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General, UN Security Council S/6253, 26 March 1965. We are all prisoners of knowledge. To know how Cyprus was betrayed, and to have studied the record of that betrayal, is to make oneself unhappy and to spoil, perhaps for ever, one’s pleasure in visiting one of the world’s most enchanting islands. Nothing will ever restore the looted treasures, the bereaved families, the plundered villages and the groves and hillsides scalded with napalm. Nor will anything mitigate the record of the callous and crude politicians who regarded Cyprus as something on which to scribble their inane and conceited designs. But fatalism would be the worst betrayal of all. The acceptance, the legitimisation of what was done–those things must be repudiated. Such a refusal has a value beyond Cyprus, in showing that acquiescence in injustice is not ‘realism’. Once the injustice has been set down and described, and called by its right name, acquiescence in it becomes impossible. That is why one writes about Cyprus in sorrow but more–much more–in anger.” Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger (London and New York: Verso, 1997). “ “

The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 6 By now it is no longer possible for violene and injustice to stifle a whole people in secret, without protest. Apparently, this world we thought had gone rotten, still has spirits that dare to rear their head against hypocricy, injustice, arrogance. It is a critical moment. The moral salvation of the whole world depends on the answer given to the Cyprus question. And on this moral salvation the political, social, cultural salvation of the world has always depended. Cyprus is no longer a detail now, a mere island at the extreme tip of the Mediterranean. It is becoming the fate-marked centre, where the moral value of contemporary man is at stake. […] There is some mystic law in this world (for if there were not, this world would have been destroyed thousands of years ago), a harsh inviolable law: in the beginning, evil always triumphs, and in the end it is always vanquished. […] For us this is a good moment to forget our passions and our petty cares; for each man of us with his own God-given gifts to follow the path of freedom throughout the land of Cyprus. And we must share her grief, her upsurge, her danger, insofar as we are capable, and surely later on (for this is the law, we said) her great joy as well.” Nikos Kazantzakis, “The Angels of Cyprus,” as it appeared as an Epilogue in his book England: A Travel Journal (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1965) The political-demographic de facto partition imposed on Cyprus since 1974 thus threatens not only the unity and integrity of a modern nation-state but also the millennial cultural integrity and continuity of the island which has been the crossroads of the civilisation of the eastern Mediterranean.” Michael Jansen,“Cyprus: The Loss of a Cultural Heritage,”(Modern Greek Studies Yearbook, 2 (1986):314-323. “ “

The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 7 Message from the President of the Republic, Mr Nikos Christodoulides, on the 50th anniversary of the Turkish invasion Sadly, this year is marked by a grim milestone for our country. It marks fifty years since the tragic summer of 1974 which divided Cyprus – and our souls – in two. That tragic summer profoundly left its mark on the lives and future of our homeland. Fifty years have passed since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, with all its devastating consequences and inflicted suffering. The occupying troops, the separation and long-term division of the land and its people. The brutal murders, the rapes, the unjust loss of thousands of lives, amongst them children, the violent uprooting of thousands of families from their domicile. Fifty years of inquiring about the fate of our missing persons. Fifty years of ongoing, illegal military occupation of more than 36% of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. Fifty years of violating fundamental freedoms and human rights of all Cypriots. Fifty years of illegal settlement, demographic, religious and cultural alteration of our land in the occupied areas. Fifty years is far too long. It is time for peace, liberation and for the reunification of our country. It is our duty and obligation to bequeath a free, reunited and prosperous homeland to our children, a member state of the European Union, where fundamental freedoms are safeguarded and defended, as it is the case in all member states of the European Union. It is our duty to do so on behalf of the thousands who have heroically lost their lives whilst defending the Republic of Cyprus on the front lines. To all those who remain enclaved in the occupied areas despite adversities and continuous hardship. As the first President of the Republic of Cyprus, born only a few months before the Turkish invasion and raised in a de facto divided Cyprus, my vision is the reunification of my country and its people, so that we can all live in peace, security and prosperity. I have been serving this vision from the very first day I assumed my duties, and I assure you that I will continue to work towards this end with assertive realism, fortitude and determination. My aim is none other than achieving a viable and lasting solution on the basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality, as defined by relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and within the framework of the principles and values of the European Union. This is the only way forward for a prosperous future for us and our children, in a modern European state with a substantial role and voice in regional and European developments, for a homeland without barbed wires and occupying troops.

Foreword In July 1974 Turkey invaded the Republic of Cyprus. This was in violation of the UN Charter and of fundamental principles of international law. The consequences of the military invasion and subsequent occupation of nearly forty percent of the sovereign territory of the Republic are still felt today. For almost five decades, Turkey’s aggression has continued unabated. With it came military occupation, forcible division, population displacement, ethnic segregation, massive violation of human rights, colonisation, attempted secession, cultural destruction, and property usurpation. These conditions, imposed by Turkey, constitute an unacceptable and unsustainable situation that has persisted on the island since 1974. We therefore stand more determined than ever to overcome this status quo, in line with international law and relevant UN Security Council resolutions, in order to ensure a stable, prosperous and secure future for all Cypriots within the European Union. Cyprus is at the crossroads of Europe and the Middle East, in a part of the world that is no stranger to conflict and instability. We are, however, convinced that the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East can change the narrative of being a region in turmoil. We can become a hub of stability, peace, and cooperation, an exemplar of the change capable in the 21st century. Cyprus seeks to act as a facilitator for this common vision and has come together with its immediate neighbours – Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Greece – building a solid network of cooperation that is underpinned by a vision to make the Mediterranean a sea of peace, cooperation and prosperity. We shall continue on this path of multilateralism anchored on respect for international legality, and we call on all countries of the region that share these values to join us. This is, after all, the essence of the guiding principles that founded the United Nations 79 years ago. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 8

The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 9 Introduction Cyprus became an independent sovereign state in August 1960. Unfortunately, since the invasion and continuing military occupation by Turkey in 1974, the island republic remains forcibly divided. The dire consequences of this invasion, occupation and forcible division along ethnic lines have been systematic violations of human rights, massive colonisation and ethnic cleansing of areas under occupation, militarisation, property usurpation and the destruction of cultural heritage. The Cyprus question remains unresolved, an affront to the international legal order, and a threat to regional stability. Turkey’s actions have been condemned by unanimous UN Security Council resolutions, UN General Assembly resolutions1, international court decisions, and decisions by other major international and regional organisations. Regrettably, most of these resolutions and decisions remain unimplemented. On 1 May 2004, the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union without achieving the desired goal of accession as a unified country. The Government and people of Cyprus, however, remain committed to a viable settlement that would allow the genuine, peaceful, and secure reunification of their country, in conformity with European norms and international law. The President of the Republic, Mr Nikos Christodoulides, has repeatedly underlined that his top priority will be to restart substantial negotiations within the agreed framework for a solution, as determined by the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, the High-Level Agreements, the European acquis and based on the convergences reached over the years. “Our aim”, he emphasises, “is none other than to reach a solution without occupying troops, foreign guarantees and invasive rights, a solution that will restore the unity of our homeland, of its territory, its people and its institutions within a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation where the human rights and safety of all citizens, without exception, will be enshrined and fully respected”. 1 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006 (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 2006).

The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 10 “Based on everything I have said above and taking into account, on the one hand the current state of affairs on an international level, and on the other hand the sheer need to reverse the unacceptable status quo in Cyprus”, President Christodoulides added, “I have already laid down the main points of our proposal for a more active involvement of the European Union in the Cyprus question, both in the efforts to resume negotiations and during the negotiating process itself. Here I must clarify that by involvement of the European Union, we mean in support of and in tandem with the efforts of the General Secretary and of the United Nations. I am convinced that the EU can play a decisive role both towards breaking the deadlock and in the course of the negotiating process, given that it possesses all these tools and motives for all parties that can lead to a mutually beneficial state of affairs. Our endeavour does not aim at creating unilateral benefit, but on gradually promoting a win-win situation. Here I must point out that the ultimate benefit for the Republic of Cyprus will be the resolution of the Cyprus problem and the reunification of Cyprus, which will also have a positive impact on the region”.

The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 11 Political Overview Seeking a negotiated solution Following Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the Turkish side demanded a solution that would keep the two communities apart, either as two separate sovereign states or two separate states under a loose confederation. The two communities agreed in 1977 and 1979 to reunite Cyprus under a bi-communal, federal republic, the parameters of which have evolved through the years. For the Greek Cypriots, who had strongly advocated the concept of a unitary state, the acceptance of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation was a historic compromise in their effort to terminate Turkey’s military occupation and achieve the reunification of Cyprus. The UN-led peace process has since 1977 sought to define the framework of such a federal solution. Negotiations have sought to reconcile the interests and concerns of the two sides under a common central government. UN Security Council resolution 367 of 12 March 1975 reactivated the Secretary-General’s mission of good offices, which had been interrupted in 1974. Since then, intermittent negotiations under UN auspices have taken place. There have been high level meetings between the two communities, proximity talks, proposals for confidence building measures, and various plans by UN and other foreign emissaries. All these actions have failed to resolve the Cyprus problem for a number of reasons, including: uFailure by Turkey to implement UN Security Council resolutions uPrevalence of third-party strategic, economic, and political considerations over a viable and functional solution that satisfies the concerns of the state of Cyprus and of all Cypriots uIntransigent policies of successive governments in Turkey who claimed that the Cyprus problem was “solved” in 1974 uPolitical conditions in the Turkish Cypriot community and insistence by Turkish leaders on the recognition of the so-called “TRNC” uDisregard of international law, European law, and precedent-setting decisions by regional and national courts in proposed “solutions” to the Cyprus problem.

Issues under discussion since 1974 The Cyprus problem has since 1974 been one of military invasion and continuing occupation in violation of fundamental principles of international law and relevant unanimous UN Security Council resolutions. Negotiations, especially after 16 January 2002, aimed at a comprehensive solution for the reunification of Cyprus. Throughout this process, the Government of Cyprus sought a solution reflecting democratic norms, the UN Security Council resolutions, international law, European Union law, and relevant court decisions. Specific issues under discussion have included: uImplementation of UN Security Council resolutions and the high level agreements that call for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation uNew power sharing formula under a federal government with adequate powers for effective governance, for safeguarding the unity of the Republic, and for meeting its international and EU obligations uContinuation of one Republic with one single sovereignty and international personality and one single citizenship uSafeguards for the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic and the exclusion in whole or in part of union with any other country or any form of partition or secession uPolitical equality between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as defined in relevant Security Council resolutions uGuarantees against foreign interference and unilateral right of intervention by another country uWithdrawal of foreign forces under relevant UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions uReturn of displaced persons and a property recovery system in conformity with the European Convention and court decisions uRight to acquire property and reside anywhere in Cyprus without restrictive quotas based on ethnic or religious criteria uFull respect for the human rights of all Cypriots under the European Convention uRepatriation of the illegal settlers to Turkey, except for a limited number based on special humanitarian considerations uCompatibility of any settlement with the obligations and rights of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU uComplete demilitarisation of the Cypriot state. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 12

UN negotiations, 2002–2004 Lack of progress in the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General led the leaders of the G-8 on 20 June 1999 to call on the parties to engage in talks on all issues without preconditions and commit to negotiate until a settlement is reached based on full consideration of relevant UN resolutions and treaties. This formula was also endorsed by UN Security Council resolution 1250 of 29 June 1999. The process, having gone through various stages, culminated in the UN proposal known as the “Annan Plan,” which was submitted to the parties first in November 2002 and subsequently, in its final form (“Annan V”), in March 2004. The direct talks between President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash which started on 16 January 2002 failed to make substantive progress. In an attempt to secure an agreement by the 12-13 December 2002 Copenhagen EU summit, which would decide on the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented on 11 November 2002 a detailed plan for a comprehensive settlement (Annan I). Following reaction by the parties, the plan was revised on 10 December 2002 (Annan II) and again on 26 February 2003 (Annan III). In January-February 2003, massive Turkish Cypriot demonstrations took place in the occupied areas against Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and his Ankara supported policies. The Republic of Cyprus, as already agreed, signed the EU Treaty of Accession on 16 April 2003. On 23 April 2003, under growing public Turkish Cypriot discontent with the situation in occupied Cyprus, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership were compelled to partially lift restrictions, which they had imposed since 1974 along the UN ceasefire line, on the movement of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Since then, thousands of Cypriots have been crossing regularly the ceasefire line. In addition, thousands of Turkish Cypriots cross daily to work in the free areas, to claim passports and other documents issued by the Government of Cyprus and to receive free medical care. These peaceful crossings have destroyed the myth cultivated for years by Turkish propaganda that the two communities cannot live together. But these measures are no substitute for a comprehensive settlement. Following continuing deadlock, even after the involvement of Greece and Turkey in the process, the Secretary-General finalised the text ("Annan V") which was submitted to the two communities in Cyprus for a vote on separate and simultaneous referenda on the 20th April 2004. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 13

The 24 April 2004 referenda–the people’s decision2 Following a spirited public debate, the Greek Cypriot voters overwhelmingly rejected Annan V, by a vote of 75,8 percent against 24,2 percent. In contrast, 64,9 percent of the Turkish Cypriot voters approved the plan. It should be noted that settlers from Turkey, who had no legal right to vote, were allowed to do so. The positive Turkish Cypriot vote is easy to explain: uRejection of the authoritarian policies of Rauf Denktash uContinuation of the illegal Turkish Cypriot “state” uLegitimisation of the status of nearly all illegal settlers from Turkey in the Turkish Cypriot component state uPermanent presence of troops from Turkey in Cyprus uRight of Turkey to intervene in Cyprus Finally, the Turkish Cypriot vote was motivated by the anticipation of substantial economic benefits emanating from the accession of Cyprus to the EU and of expected economic support from the Greek Cypriot community. Various legitimate reasons explain the Greek Cypriot negative vote, including: uRigid negotiating deadlines, no real time for discussion of a most complex legal document, and threats expressed or implied by some of the interlocutors if the Greek Cypriots did not accept the UN plan uMajor derogations from the European Convention of Human Rights depriving all Cypriots of fundamental rights, while other EU nationals residing in Cyprus would enjoy all such rights under the Convention uDissolution of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus and replacement by a loose confederation of two largely autonomous states uQuestionable functionality of the new state in view of the provisions on the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches, and the presence of enhanced minority vetoes. (Non-Cypriot third parties, unaccountable to the Cypriot public, would cast deciding votes in key policy areas) uConfederal nature of the proposed constitution was reflected in the absence of a provision on the hierarchy of laws. (This carried the risk of jurisdictional conflicts, which would accentuate the divisive nature of the proposed new polity) 2 See Claire Palley, An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999–2004 (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005). The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 14

uAbsence of adequate guarantees to ensure that the commitments undertaken by the parties and particularly Turkey would be carried out uEconomic cost of the proposed settlement –convergence, reconstruction, property compensation, compensation to settlers, monetary policy– would be largely borne by the Greek Cypriots. (Turkey, whose military aggression divided the island, was absolved of any financial responsibility for its actions in Cyprus) uSecurity issues involving the gradual reduction and continued presence of Turkish troops with expanded intervention rights even after Turkey joins the EU. (The “United” Cyprus was excluded from the common European defense policy and would be totally demilitarised. Turkey’s proposed guarantees violated the obligation of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states and the respect of the territorial integrity of all states) uIssues of citizenship definition and the fact that nearly all settlers from Turkey would remain in Cyprus uViolations of property rights that are essential rights under the European Convention and overturning of important European Court precedents uExpansion of Britain’s rights in the sovereign base areas and in the Republic’s territorial waters uDeletion of the ratification by the Republic of Cyprus of the 1936 Montreux Treaty (Cyprus is a major maritime power. The plan also granted Turkey near veto rights on the continental shelf of Cyprus) uViolation of the European Convention by denying the right of Cypriots to acquire property and live wherever they chose, as other EU nationals could, without restrictive quotas based on ethnicity and religion. The plan was rejected because it was judged by the great majority of Cypriots not to be the best for the common interest of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. As President Papadopoulos stated at the time, “while all demands by Turkey were adopted in the final Plan on the last day, basic concerns of the Greek Cypriot side were disregarded. All involved in the talks were anxious to bring Turkey on board and ensure a ‘yes’ vote by the Turkish Cypriot community, and ignored the fact that the far bigger Greek Cypriot community also needed to be convinced to vote ‘yes’ on the Plan. Thus, this process failed to address the legitimate concerns, needs, and interests of both sides.” The negative outcome of the referendum rendered the Annan Plan null and void. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 15

Alleged Turkish Cypriot isolation3 Following the rejection of the Annan Plan, Turkey launched a propaganda campaign under the slogans of “easing,”“lifting” or “ending” the alleged “isolation” of Turkish Cypriots. Regrettably, this has led to widespread misinformation, regarding the situation in Cyprus, and to some questionable proposals, ostensibly to improve the economic conditions of Turkish Cypriots. Turkey has even tried to mislead the international community into believing that the Government of Cyprus was, somehow, responsible for the predicament of the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey used this approach for two reasons: to divert, in view of its EU aspirations, attention from its ongoing military aggression against Cyprus and to upgrade the illegal regime in the occupied areas of the island. In essence, Ankara has been seeking to secure for the secessionist regime economic attributes of an independent entity. However, any moves promoting the de facto recognition of the illegal secessionist regime would be in direct violation of international law and UN Security Council resolutions, especially resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). Such moves would also undermine efforts for the country’s reunification, in line with the agreed framework, which is the declared position of the UN, the EU, and the international community at large, by removing any incentive for the secessionist regime for constructive participation in the peace process. In doing so, they would help to solidify the illegal situation created by Turkey in the occupied part of Cyprus and to perpetuate the victimisation of Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, such ideas divert attention from Turkey’s failure to abide by its obligations to the EU, including the opening of its seaports and airports to ships and aircraft carrying the Cyprus flag. The plight of the Turkish Cypriot community has been the direct result of Turkey’s aggression, which keeps Cyprus, its people, institutions and economy divided. It is also the result of misguided policies by Turkish Cypriot leaders, who have consistently promoted Turkey’s interests at the expense of their own community and of Cyprus as a whole. The so-called “isolation” of Turkish Cypriots is very much a self-inflicted wound. It is certainly not the result of any action taken by the Government of Cyprus, which has sovereignty over all the territory of the state, including the occupied areas, and which acts in line with its obligation to defend its sovereign rights and the rule of law. 3 See Miltos Miltiadou, Toward a Unified Cyprus: The Myth of Turkish Cypriot “Isolation,” Fourth Edition (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 2010). The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 16

In response to Turkey’s military aggression, the Republic of Cyprus introduced a number of defensive measures to safeguard its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economy. One of these measures was the declaration of all seaports and airports in the Turkish occupied area of the Republic as illegal. Such measures became necessary, because the Government was not able to exercise effective control in the areas of Cyprus under Turkish military control. Under international law, the Republic of Cyprus is the only legal and recognised authority with sole responsibility for air and sea travel, trade, security, safety, and similar issues within its sovereign territory. Similarly, under international law, the regime established by Turkey in occupied Cyprus is illegal and, therefore, all its professed institutions, decisions, and documents have no political or legal validity. As European Courts and the UN Security Council have affirmed, the regime has no legal status in the international community. The European Court of Human Rights has declared this illegal regime as Turkey’s“subordinate local administration”in occupied Cyprus (See Appendix 2). The record clearly shows that the military occupation by Turkey has victimised, albeit in different ways, both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island. Turkey’s continuing occupation is directly responsible for whatever sense of “isolation” Turkish Cypriots may have experienced. In fact, Turkey prevents Turkish Cypriots from realising their full potential and deprives them of substantial benefits and opportunities they are entitled to as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus and the EU. The Government of Cyprus has always been concerned about the economic situation of Turkish Cypriots. It has been better able to provide services to Turkish Cypriots since the partial lifting in 2003 of illegal restrictions, imposed by the Turkish military on the free movement of people across the 1974 UN ceasefire line that extends across the island. Turkish Cypriots have since been able to work, in increasing numbers, in the government-controlled areas earning income estimated at more than 273 million euro so far and to enjoy an expanded range of benefits, including free medical care (See Appendix 1). Reviving the peace process 2005–2006 Even though the 2002–2004 UN effort did not resolve the Cyprus problem, the referendum was not the end of the road. In order to revive the peace process, President Tassos Papadopoulos exchanged views with the Secretary-General in New York on 16 September 2005 concerning the preparation of a renewed effort on Cyprus by the UN. The Secretary-General also met with Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, on 31 October. In his report to the Security Council on 20 November 2005, the The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 17

Secretary-General noted that both leaders and many countries urged him to consider holding new talks in the context of his good offices mission. President Papadopoulos subsequently met with the Secretary-General in Paris, on 28 February 2006, where they reviewed the situation in Cyprus and examined modalities for moving forward on the process leading to the reunification of the island. They also agreed that the resumption of the negotiating process within the framework of the Secretary-General’s good offices must be timely and based on careful preparation. The 8 July 2006 agreement This outcome generated a new momentum for the resumption of the peace process on Cyprus. On July 3, President Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Talat met on the sidelines of a meeting of the Committee on Missing Persons and in the presence of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Cyprus. In addition, the UN Under SecretaryGeneral for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, visited Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus during 3-9 July. Following a joint meeting on 8 July with President Papadopoulos and Mr Talat, the UN Under-Secretary presented the following “Set of Principles” agreed to by the parties: 1. Commitment to the unification of Cyprus based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation and political equality, as set out in the relevant Security Council resolutions. 2. Recognition of the fact that the status quo is unacceptable and that its prolongation would have negative consequences for the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. 3. Commitment to the proposition that a comprehensive settlement is both desirable and possible and should not be further delayed. 4. Agreement to begin a process immediately, involving bicommunal discussion of issues that affect the day to day life of the people and concurrently those that concern substantive issues, both of which will contribute to a comprehensive settlement. 5. Commitment to ensure that the‘right atmosphere’prevails for this process to be successful. In that connection, confidence building measures are essential, both in terms of improving the atmosphere and improving the life of all Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Also in that connection, an end must be put to the so- called ‘blame game.’ In addition, the two leaders decided that technical committees on issues that affect day to day life would commence work provided that, at the same time, they would also have exchanged a list of issues of substance, the contents of which would be studied by expert bi-communal working groups and finalised by the leaders. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 18

The 8 July Agreement reaffirmed the Cyprus government’s commitment to reunify the island on the basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. On 29 August 2006, the UN Security Council urged the implementation of the 8 July Agreement without further delay and expressed its support for the continued efforts of the Secretary-General to achieve a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus. In order to facilitate the process, on 15 November 2006 the UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs provided suggestions for the implementation of the 8 July Agreement. Unfortunately, difficulties appeared during the preparatory phase, because the Turkish side questioned the fundamental elements of the Agreement. In a letter to the UN SecretaryGeneral in April 2007, the Turkish Cypriot leader sought to alter the agreed framework of the 8 July Agreement. For the Government of Cyprus as well as for the United Nations, the 8 July Agreement procedure became the only way available leading to a mutually acceptable solution. However, its implementation was undermined by the prevarications of the Turkish side. New initiatives in 2008 yield results In February 2008, the new President of the Republic of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, immediately after his election, sought a meeting with the Turkish Cypriot leader. At their meeting on 21 March 2008, it was decided to set up working groups and technical committees and to draw up a list of issues to be considered. It was decided to hold a new meeting in three months to evaluate the progress in order to enable the start of direct negotiations, under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the UN. At the same time, it was decided to open the Ledra Street crossing point. On April 3, 2008, the crossing point on Ledras Street was opened, while on April 18, six working groups and seven technical committees launched sessions. In the absence of progress justifying the resumption of negotiations, at the initiative of President Christofias, the two leaders met again on 23 May 2008, in the presence of UN Special Representative for Cyprus, Taye-Brook Zerihoun. The meeting reaffirmed the commitment to create a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with single sovereignty, single international personality and single nationality, and political equality, as described in the resolutions of the Security Council of the UN. It was also agreed to seek the opening of other crossing points. Furthermore, the two leaders agreed to consider confidence-building measures. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 19

On the 1st of July 2008, the two leaders revised for the first time the work of the working groups and technical committees. They also discussed the issues of sovereignty and citizenship, on which they agreed, as matters of principle. Details on their implementation would be discussed during the direct talks. In a new meeting on July 25, 2008, it was decided to start direct negotiations on September 3, 2008. The new negotiation process aimed to find a solution "from the Cypriots for the Cypriots" on the basis of an agreement between the two leaders that would receive the approval of the people and which would guarantee the fundamental and legal rights and interests of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. In joint statements, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, while agreeing on one single sovereignty, single citizenship, and single international personality of the Cyprus federation. Negotiations leading to Crans Montana To emphasize his support for the peace negotiations, the Secretary-General of the United Nations paid a tripartite visit to Cyprus in early 2010. On April 18, 2010, Mehmet Ali Talat was succeeded by Dervis Eroglu as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. President Christofias and the new Turkish Cypriot leader had many unfruitful meetings until July 1, 2012, when Cyprus took over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Throughout the Presidency, the Turkish side refused to enter into talks despite assurances from the President that there was no impediment. On February 11, 2014, the first official meeting of the new President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, and the the Turkish Cypriot leader, Dervis Eroglu, took place under the auspices of the UN, which set the framework for the new negotiation process and reaffirmed the basic principles of the solution. The launch of a new process of substantive negotiations renewed international interest, creating new positive momentum for resolving the problem. This was followed by three years of negotiations that led to significant progress. As a result, in June 2017, the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, convened a Conference on Cyprus in Crans Montana, Switzerland. The Conference was attended by the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot side with its new leader (since 2015) Mustafa Akinci, the three guarantor powers Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, and the European Union as an observer. The Conference came to a standstill due to Turkey's insistence on the permanent presence of military troops in Cyprus and on maintaining its rights as a guarantor power. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 20

Despite this negative development, the Cypriot government remained steadfastly committed to reaching a solution to the Cyprus problem through talks under the auspices of the United Nations. Despite the non-constructive attitude of Turkey, the Secretary-General of the United Nations appointed Jane Holl Lute as Special Adviser to resume the negotiation process. Successive rounds of contacts led to the meeting of the Secretary-General with the leaders of the two communities on November 25, 2019, in Berlin during which the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to reach a solution based on a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation with political equality, as defined in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. On 27-29 April 2021, the UN Secretary General convened the informal 5+1 meeting on Cyprus, in Geneva, with the aim to achieve a breakthrough for the resumption of a process of negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Unfortunately, the refusal of Turkey and of the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community to reaffirm their commitment to the agreed basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality as defined in UN resolutions, their insistence on the equal status of the "two-states" as a precondition for the resumption of negotiations and their rejection of the Secretary-General's proposal for the appointment of a special envoy, led the effort to a deadlock. Immediately upon assuming his duties as President of the Republic of Cyprus in March 2023, Nikos Christodoulides, has proclaimed as his absolute and predominant priority to exert every possible effort to break the current stalemate and resume negotiations in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the EU acquis and previous convergences. To this end he stressed that the proposed solution should establish a functional state, without any foreign guarantees and without occupation troops under a constitutional framework allowing all citizens, Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike, to live in conditions of security, understanding, and in full respect of their fundamental rights. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has welcomed the appointment, in January 2024, of Maria Angela Cuellar Holguin as the Personal Envoy of the Secretary General for the Cyprus Problem. This constitutes a positive development, one that we hope can generate new momentum for a renewed effort leading to the resumption of the negotiations on the agreed basis. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus stands ready to exert every effort for the resumption of the negotiation process based on the agreed basis for a solution which is a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality as set out in the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 21

Cyprus and the European Union 2024 marks the 20th anniversary of Cyprus' accession to the European Union. The Republic of Cyprus signed an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1972 and applied for membership in the European Communities in 1990. The European Commission issued a positive avis (opinion) in 1993 recognizing the importance of Cyprus’accession for the security and prosperity of the island and for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. The European Council agreed in 1995 that accession negotiations with Cyprus would commence six months after the conclusion of the EU intergovernmental conference of 1996. At the European Conference in London, on 12 March 1998, the President of the Republic of Cyprus invited the Turkish Cypriot community to join the Cypriot EU negotiating team, but the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected the invitation. By December 2002, all chapters in the negotiations with the EU were closed and the harmonisation process was completed. Cyprus signed the Treaty of Accession in Athens on 16 April 2003, became a member of the EU on 1 May 2004, participated in the 2004 elections for the European Parliament, and joined the eurozone on 1 January 2008. Under Protocol 10 annexed to the Treaty of Accession, the application of the acquis in the areas of Cyprus occupied by Turkey would be suspended until the Cyprus problem was resolved. The same protocol stated the readiness of the EU “to accommodate the terms of such a settlement in line with the principles on which the EU is founded.” While the UN Secretary-General’s mission of good offices has provided the framework for a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem, the EU has a central role in assuring that any proposed settlement conforms to its principles and legal norms. Turkey’s EU accession process and broader EU-Turkey relations also provide a comprehensive framework of obligations, the fullfillment of which can help address some of the thorniest aspects of the Cyprus problem, such as protection of human rights, non-intervention, the sovereignty of the Republic, and the functionality of government institutions. Unfortunately, Turkey’s unilateral declaration on the non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus at the time of its ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, as well as its continuous refusal to fulfill its obligations stemming from the latter, raises serious questions about Turkey’s compliance with EU norms and obligations and its intentions in the search for a viable settlement of the Cyprus problem. The EU responded to this unilateral declaration with a Declaration of its own calling on Turkey to comply with its obligations and has reiterated that position on several occasions to no avail. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 22

Turkey still refuses access to its ports, airports, and air corridors to aircraft and ships from the Republic of Cyprus. This awkward and anomalous situation, where an EU candidate state refuses to recognize one of the EU member states. The EU in December 2006 sanctioned Turkey by imposing a partial freeze on its accession talks for its non-compliance with respect to its obligations toward Cyprus. It was decided to suspend work in eight of 35 policy areas (Chapters) into which accession negotiations are divided. It was also agreed that negotiations on chapters not affected by this freeze should not be concluded until Turkey complies with its obligations related to the Additional Protocol. Turkey’s negative stance towards the Republic of Cyprus is also reflected in all European Commission Progress Reports on Turkey as well as in relevant European Council and Council Conclusions. The 2023 Commission Report, among others, points out the following: Turkey continued to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus. Despite repeated calls by the Council of the EU and the European Commission, Turkey has yet to fulfil its obligations as outlined in the Declaration of the European Community and its member states of 21 September 2005 and in Council Conclusions, including those of December 2006 and December 2015. Turkey did not fulfil its obligation to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and did not remove all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with the Republic of Cyprus...Turkey's military exercises in the maritime zones of Cyprus continued. Violations by Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles in the Lefkosia flight information region and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus also continued unabated. Turkey continued to increase the militarisation of the occupied area by upgrading the military drone base in Lefkoniko and the naval base in Bogazi. The harassment of Cypriot fishing vessels by Turkey also continued...Despite international condemnations, and the inadmissibility of the settlement of any parts of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as stipulated in UNSC resolution 550 (1984), Turkey continued with its plan to open the entire fenced-off area of Varosha, creating a new fait accompli on the ground... Turkey repeatedly advocated for a two-state solution in Cyprus, contrary to relevant UN Security Council resolutions. In November 2022, the so-called but not internationally recognised ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ was accepted as an observer in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). This violates the principle of territorial integrity and the UN Charter. The EU recognises only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law, in accordance The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 23

with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and has stressed that any action to facilitate or assist in any way the international recognition of Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity severely damages efforts to create an environment conducive to resuming settlement talks under the auspices of the United Nations... As emphasised in the Negotiating Framework and Council declarations, Turkey is expected to actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the EU acquis. It is important that Turkey reaffirms its commitment to the UN-led settlement talks on Cyprus in line with the relevant UNSC resolutions, including their external aspects. No unilateral actions should be taken that could raise tensions on the island and prevent the resumption of talks. On Varosha, Turkey must immediately reverse the unilateral actions announced on 20 July 2021 and all steps taken since October 2020 that run contrary to the relevant UNSC resolutions. The EU underlines the importance of the status of Varosha and calls for full respect of UNSC resolutions (particularly resolutions 550, 789 and 1251). Moreover, the European Council Conclusions of April 2024, reflecting the firm link between Turkey's stance on the Cyprus problem and progress on EU-Turkey relations, point out the following: The European Council held a strategic debate on EU-Turkey relations, taking note of the Joint Communication of the High Representative and Commission on the state of play of EU-Turkey political, economic and trade relations. The European Union has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey. The European Council tasks Coreper, respecting the competences of the relevant institutions, to advance work on the recommendations of the Joint Communication in line with previous European Council conclusions and in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner, subject to additional guidance from the European Council. Turkey’s own constructive engagement will be instrumental in advancing the various areas of cooperation identified in the Joint Communication. In this regard, the European Union attaches particular importance to resumption of and progress in the Cyprus settlement talks in further enhancing EU-Turkey cooperation. Recalling its previous conclusions, the European Council remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded and the acquis. The European Council welcomes the appointment of María Angela Holguín Cuéllar The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 24

as the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy on Cyprus. The European Union is ready to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process, with all appropriate means at its disposal. Conclusion The people of Cyprus still yearn for the reunification of their country. The Government of Cyprus is determined to continue its search for a viable and functional solution within the parameters of the UN resolutions as well as the new political context created by the accession of Cyprus to the EU, in order to safeguard the rights of all Cypriots. In this manner, all Cypriots will fully enjoy the benefits and advantages of EU membership and bring about the reunification of their country after five decades of division. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 25

Historical Background From Independence to the Turkish invasion, 1960–1974 Cyprus was proclaimed an independent, sovereign republic on 16 August 1960. The independence of Cyprus was based on the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements negotiated by Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. These agreements included a Constitution and three treaties: the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment. These agreements ended 82 years of British rule following many years of a national liberation movement that included peaceful mass anticolonial protests and demonstrations, recourse to the United Nations for self-determination for the people of the island to decide their own future, and eventually a four-year armed struggle (1955–59). Active opposition to colonial rule came from the Greek Cypriot community, whose majority at the time aspired to union of Cyprus with Greece. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, on the other hand, prompted by the British, advocated partition of the island with a Turkish Cypriot sector uniting with Turkey. (These diametrically opposed visions were later specifically prohibited by the 1959 agreements that established Cyprus’ independence). British rule did not encourage the emergence of a Cypriot national identity. Instead, Britain used the “divide and rule” policy as an instrument to control anticolonial sentiment on the island. It enlisted Turkish Cypriots on its side against the Greek Cypriot liberation movement, thereby planting the seeds of intercommunal discord and polarisation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, a development that was to prove detrimental to their cooperation upon independence. Although they eventually signed the Zurich and London agreements, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities had no serious role in their drafting or in the drafting of the Constitution for the new republic. In fact, the very people who would be affected the most by these elaborate documents were never given the opportunity to vote on them. In effect, both the agreements and the Constitution of the nascent republic were imposed on the people of Cyprus. As a result, the fate of the new republic was jeopardized in vitro. Certain provisions of the agreements and the Constitution, rather than promoting peace through intercommunal solidarity and loyalty to a common state as well as respect for the sovereignty of the new republic, proved conducive to domestic conflict and foreign interference. It soon became clear that Cyprus was granted a fettered independence and dysfunctional constitutional arrangements. The Constitution itself emphasised differences between Greek The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 26

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