General assumed the power of arbitrator as a precondition for the new round of talks. In accepting this formula, the Greek Cypriots assumed that the Secretariat would maintain its objectivity and commitment to fundamental UN principles. They were proven wrong. By the time of the talks in Switzerland late in March 2004, the Secretariat became a partial party to the dispute by promoting most of Turkey’s positions on the Cyprus problem. The change in the Secretary-General’s role, coupled with extremely tight negotiating deadlines and Turkey’s intransigence, contributed to the absence of serious negotiations both in Nicosia and subsequently in Bürgenstock, Switzerland. In order to gain Turkey’s consent, nearly all of its demands were incorporated arbitrarily in the two plans (Annan IV and V), presented by the Secretary-General. Annan V was presented to the two sides on 31 March 2004. Turkey, the United States and the United Nations agreed to accept the EU presence only on an observer status in the talks, while the EU made the commitment to accommodate the derogations from European law that were included in Annan V. The Secretary-General’s plan was a comprehensive document of nearly 10.000 pages. This complex, legal document was not available in its totality on the UN website until hours before the referendum. Cypriots were called to vote on the document on 24 April 2004, only days before the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU on 1 May. The 24 April 2004 referenda–the people’s decision2 Following a spirited public debate, the Greek Cypriot voters overwhelmingly rejected Annan V, by a vote of 75,8 percent against 24,2 percent. In contrast, 64,9 percent of the Turkish Cypriot voters approved the plan. It should be noted that settlers from Turkey, who had no legal right to vote, were allowed to do so. The Greek Cypriot “no” vote was not a vote against reunification or reconciliation. It was a rejection of a process that led to a one-sided plan perceived harmful to the legitimate rights of the Greek Cypriot community and to the survival of the state of Cyprus itself. It was a rejection of a flawed plan that did not provide for the genuine reunification of Cyprus, its institutions, people, and economy. This negative vote came from Greek Cypriots of all ages, political parties, and gender. 2 See Claire Palley, An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999–2004 (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005). The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 17
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