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The Cyprus Question

a brief introduction TheCyprus Question

Editorial supervision: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus Seventh edition updates: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus Original text: Van Coufoudakis, Miltos Miltiadou The sale or other commercial exploitation of this publication or part of it is strictly prohibited. Excerpts from the publication may be reproduced with appropriate acknowledgment of this publication as the source of the material used. Press and Information Office publications are available free of charge.

Seventh edition 2023 a brief introduction TheCyprus Question

The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction Contents FOREWORD 19 INTRODUCTION 11 POLITICAL OVERVIEW 13 Seeking a negotiated solution 13 Issues under discussion since 1974 14 UN negotiations, 2002–2004 15 The 24 April 2004 referenda–the people’s decision 17 Alleged Turkish Cypriot isolation 20 Reviving the peace process 2005–2006 22 The 8th July 2006 agreements 23 New initiatives in 2008 yield results 24 Negotiations leading to Crans Montana 25 Cyprus and the European Union 27 Conclusion 30 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 31 From Independence to the Turkish invasion, 1960–1974 31 Turkish military invasion and occupation 34 Our vision for a reunified Cyprus 37 MAPS 38 APPENDICES 41 1. Policy initiatives for Turkish Cypriots 41 2. Important legal decisions on the Cyprus question 43 3. Consequences of the Turkish invasion and occupation - facts and figures 48 CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS 50 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 57

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The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 5 … if the purpose of a settlement of the Cyprus question is to be the preservation rather than the destruction of the state and if it is to foster rather than to militate against the development of a peacefully united people, I cannot help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from the majority should not be considered a desperate step in the wrong direction.” Dr Galo Plaza, Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General, UN Security Council S/6253, 26 March 1965. We are all prisoners of knowledge. To know how Cyprus was betrayed, and to have studied the record of that betrayal, is to make oneself unhappy and to spoil, perhaps for ever, one’s pleasure in visiting one of the world’s most enchanting islands. Nothing will ever restore the looted treasures, the bereaved families, the plundered villages and the groves and hillsides scalded with napalm. Nor will anything mitigate the record of the callous and crude politicians who regarded Cyprus as something on which to scribble their inane and conceited designs. But fatalism would be the worst betrayal of all. The acceptance, the legitimization of what was done–those things must be repudiated. Such a refusal has a value beyond Cyprus, in showing that acquiescence in injustice is not ‘realism’. Once the injustice has been set down and described, and called by its right name, acquiescence in it becomes impossible. That is why one writes about Cyprus in sorrow but more–much more–in anger.” Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger (London and New York: Verso, 1997). “ “

The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 6 By now it is no longer possible for violene and injustice to stifle a whole people in secret, without protest. Apparently, this world we thought had gone rotten, still has spirits that dare to rear their head against hypocricy, injustice, arrogance. It is a critical moment. The moral salvation of the whole world depends on the answer given to the Cyprus question. And on this moral salvation the political, social, cultural salvation of the world has always depended. Cyprus is no longer a detail now, a mere island at the extreme tip of the Mediterranean. It is becoming the fate-marked center, where the moral value of contemporary man is at stake. […] There is some mystic law in this world (for if there were not, this world would have been destroyed thousands of years ago), a harsh inviolable law: in the beginning, evil always triumphs, and in the end it is always vanquished. […] For us this is a good moment to forget our passions and our petty cares; for each man of us with his own God-given gifts to follow the path of freedom throughout the land of Cyprus. And we must share her grief, her upsurge, her danger, insofar as we are capable, and surely later on (for this is the law, we said) her great joy as well.” Nikos Kazantzakis, “The Angels of Cyprus,” as it appeared as an Epilogue in his book England: A Travel Journal (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1965) The political-demographic de facto partition imposed on Cyprus since 1974 thus threatens not only the unity and integrity of a modern nation- state but also the millennial cultural integrity and continuity of the island which has been the crossroads of the civilization of the eastern Mediterranean.” Michael Jansen,“Cyprus: The Loss of a Cultural Heritage,”(Modern Greek Studies Yearbook, 2 (1986):314-323. “ “

The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 7 Excerpts from the speech by the President of the Republic, Mr Nikos Christodoulides before the House of Representatives, on 28 February 2023 The empty seats of the Turkish-Cypriot members in this room (the House of Representatives) bear witness, among many other things, to the mutilation that our state has suffered. A mutilation that does not permit the true establishment of conditions of peace and security, or of the implementation of the fundamental freedoms and human rights of all Cypriots. It is for this reason that I wish today to repeat before you my pledge that my top priority will be the solution of the Cyprus problem within the agreed framework, in order that our country can at last become a reunified, free, contemporary, European state, a common land of prosperity and security for all its legal citizens, without discrimination. Naturally, I have no illusions. I am aware that all my predecessors, whose names I recall with respect, gave the same pledge: The first President, Archbishop Makarios, Spyros Kyprianou, George Vasiliou, Glafcos Clerides, Tassos Papadopoulos, Demetris Christofias, and the outgoing President, Nicos Anastasiades. They all left the Presidency without achieving the sincere dream of freedom and reunification for our country, despite their heartfelt desire to achieve this goal. The reason for the failure to achieve reunification was that the demands of the Turkish side went beyond our own limits and beyond the limits that democracy and human rights impose on every modern democratic country and its citizens. Despite the compromises made over the years by our side. Even after the historic compromise of the acceptance of a Bizonal Bicommunal federation, Turkish maximalism has not permitted any effort to bear fruit in a way that would safeguard the interests of all the legal citizens of the island and no one else. Of course, this does not mean that our side never made any mistakes or omissions. Last week I had my first unofficial meeting with the Turkish-Cypriot leader. I expressed to him my clear position that the current state of affairs cannot constitute the solution to the Cyprus problem and that I will do all that is humanly possible to create those conditions that will lead to a reopening of the dialogue based on the agreed framework for a solution of a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation. I also conveyed my sincere desire for a dialogue to the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General. In the next few days, I will undertake initiatives, based on the positions I developed before the election, in order to break the deadlock, to ensure that the EU will be involved in a leading role at the highest level, always in the framework of the good services of the UN SG.

From this formal platform of the House of Representatives, I address myself today to our Turkish-Cypriot compatriots. I wish to convey to them the message that the solution we are aiming for will serve the interests of all the Cypriots. The security and prosperity of us all is essential if we are to live in peace in our common land without divisions and without an army of occupation and foreign guarantees. Only in this way can we secure the future of our children without building on sand. If a solution is found for the Cyprus problem, the Cyprus Republic will be able to evolve into our common home within the great European family. This is the solution we envision. I address myself also to our refugees, our enclaved persons, the casualties, the relatives of the missing persons, all those who are suffering because of the traumas of the invasion and continued occupation. I wish to assure them that they remain at the forefront of our efforts to end the occupation and reunify our homeland. I could not of course fail to address the representatives of the three religious groups that are present here, and send a message of respect and appreciation to our fellow citizens: the Maronites, Armenians and Latins, whose concerns and expectations are also our own. Finally, I would like to make special reference to the overseas Cypriots, with whom I have been blessed to have worked closely, and to assure them of my sincere desire to tighten our bonds further. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 8

Foreword In July 1974 Turkey invaded the Republic of Cyprus. This was in violation of the UN Charter and of fundamental principles of international law. The consequences of the military invasion and subsequent occupation of nearly forty percent of the sovereign territory of the Republic are still felt today. For almost five decades, Turkey’s aggression has continued unabated. With it came military occupation, forcible division, population displacement, ethnic segregation, massive violation of human rights, colonization, attempted secession, cultural destruction, and property usurpation. These conditions, imposed by Turkey, constitute an unacceptable situation that has persisted on the island since 1974. As pointed out by the President of the Republic, Mr Nikos Christodoulides, Turkey is the country which has installed in the occupied areas a separatist entity that is utterly subservient to it, and is now advancing its upgrade. Such aims and objectives are certainly relevant to Turkey’s regional aims and objectives in the wider area. “At the same time”, President Christodoulides remarks, “Turkey is a neighbouring country of Cyprus. We are fully aware that geography cannot change, but our wish is to have a neighbouring Turkey that respects international law and with which we can have good neighbouring relations, as we do with the rest of our neighbouring countries”. Today, Turkey, an aspiring member of the European Union, still stands guilty of international aggression against Cyprus, a member-state of the Union. The status quo of foreign military occupation and forcible division of an independent, sovereign state must be redressed by the international community. This informational booklet, updated for the present edition, is intended to introduce the reader to basic aspects of a major international issue, the Cyprus Question or Cyprus Problem, as it is commonly referred to, and to the prospects for a viable settlement in line with European norms and the rule of law. It is a brief guide to a protracted and seemingly intractable conflict that provides background information to help place the current situation and new developments in proper historical perspective. The more recent phase of the Cyprus problem, as it has developed since 1974, is dealt with in the first section, “Political Overview,” while the “Historical Background” to the issue is covered in the subsequent section of the booklet. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 9

The appendices and the chronology of key events that follow provide useful information relevant to the main text. The short, select bibliography, indicative of the vast literature on the Cyprus problem, can provide the interested reader with both a better understanding of and further guidance to an international issue that has engaged the international community for decades. It is important to keep in mind that throughout the text, the terms “Turkish Cypriots” and “Turkish Cypriot community,” refer specifically and exclusively to the legal, indigenous, native Cypriot citizens of the Republic of Cyprus that are of Turkish ethnic background. These terms do not refer to and definitely exclude the tens of thousands of illegal settlers imported from Turkey into occupied Cyprus after 1974. The influx of these settlers, who have entered and remain illegally on the island, has been part of Ankara’s systematic effort to change the demographic structure of the Republic of Cyprus. More information on the various dimensions of the Cyprus problem can be found on the website www.pio.gov.cy and in numerous publications of the Press and Information Office (PIO). The PIO website is a convenient, comprehensive venue to current developments, background information, and useful links to other relevant sources. The reader is urged to explore this valuable resource for a more thorough understanding of the issues discussed in this booklet. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 10

The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 11 Introduction Cyprus became an independent sovereign state in August 1960. Unfortunately, since the invasion and continuing military occupation by Turkey in 1974, the island republic remains forcibly divided. The dire consequences of this invasion, occupation and forcible division have been systematic violations of human rights, massive colonization of areas under occupation, property usurpation, the destruction of cultural heritage and ethnic separation. The Cyprus question remains unresolved, an affront to the international legal order, and a threat to regional stability. Turkey’s actions have been condemned by unanimous UN Security Council resolutions, UN General Assembly resolutions1, international court decisions, and decisions by other major international and regional organizations. Regrettably, most of these resolutions and decisions remain unimplemented. As a result, the Republic of Cyprus is the only country in Europe since the end of the Cold War that remains forcibly divided because of foreign military occupation. On 1 May 2004, the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union without achieving the desired goal of accession as a unified country. The government and people of Cyprus, however, remain committed to a viable settlement that would allow the genuine, peaceful, and secure reunification of their country, in conformity with European norms. Only then will all Cypriots be able to benefit fully from EU membership. On 24 April 2004, the Greek Cypriot community overwhelmingly rejected a proposal submitted by the UN Secretary-General for the settlement of the Cyprus problem because it did not provide for a genuine reunification of Cyprus, its society, economy, and institutions. However, the government and the Greek Cypriot community remain firmly committed to the Secretary-General’s mission of good offices and for a sustained peace process that will facilitate a viable, comprehensive settlement by the two communities themselves. The President of the Republic, Mr Nikos Christodoulides, has repeatedly underlined that his top priority will be to restart substantial negotiations within the agreed framework for a solution, as determined by the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, the High-Level Agreements and the European acquis. 1 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006 (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 2006).

“Our aim”, he emphasizes,“is none other than to reach a solution without occupying troops, foreign guarantees and invasive rights, a solution that will restore the unity of our homeland, of its territory, its people and its institutions within a Bizonal, Bicommunal Federal state where the human rights and safety of all citizens, without exception, will be enshrined and fully respected”. “Based on everything I have said above and taking into account, on the one hand the current state of affairs on an international level, and on the other hand the sheer need to reverse the unacceptable status quo in Cyprus”, President Christodoulides added, “I have already laid down the main points of our proposal for a more active involvement of the European Union in the Cyprus question, both in the efforts to resume negotiations and during the negotiating process itself. Here I must clarify that by involvement of the European Union, we mean in support of and in tandem with the efforts of the General Secretary and of the United Nations. I am convinced that the EU can play a decisive role both towards breaking the deadlock and in the course of the negotiating process, given that it possesses all these tools and motives for all parties that can lead to a mutually beneficial state of things. Our endeavour neither leans upon nor shall it concentrate exclusively on creating unilateral benefit, but on gradually promoting a win-win situation. Here I must point out that the ultimate benefit for the Republic of Cyprus will be the resolution of the Cyprus problem and the reunification of Cyprus, which will also have a positive impact on the area”. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 12

Political Overview Seeking a negotiated solution Following Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the Turkish side demanded a solution that would keep the two communities apart, either as two separate sovereign states or two separate states under a loose confederation. The two communities agreed in 1977 and 1979 to reunite Cyprus under a bicommunal, federal republic, the parameters of which had evolved through the years. For the Greek Cypriots, who had strongly advocated the concept of a unitary state, the acceptance of a bizonal, bicommunal federation was the ultimate concession and historic compromise in their effort to terminate Turkey’s military occupation and achieve the reunification of Cyprus. The UN-led peace process has since 1977 sought to define the framework of such a federal solution. Negotiations have sought to reconcile the interests and concerns of the two sides under a common central government. Issues of definitions of objectives and ways to implement a comprehensive federal settlement became serious problems mainly because of the intransigence of Turkey, the occupying power, which holds the key to a final settlement and should be pressured to adopt a constructive attitude toward the peace effort. UN Security Council resolution 367 of 12 March 1975 reactivated the Secretary-General’s mission of good offices, which had been interrupted in 1974. Since then, intermittent negotiations under UN auspices have taken place. There have been high level meetings between successive presidents of the Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot leaders, proximity talks, proposals for confidence building measures, and various plans by UN and other foreign emissaries. All these actions have failed to resolve the Cyprus problem for a number of reasons, including: uFailure to implement UN Security Council resolutions uPrevalence of third-party strategic, economic, and political considerations over a viable and functional solution that satisfies the concerns of the state of Cyprus and of all Cypriots uIntransigent policies of successive governments in Turkey who claimed that the Cyprus problem was “solved” in 1974 The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 13

uPolitical conditions in the Turkish Cypriot community and insistence by Turkish leaders on the recognition of the so-called “TRNC” uAll major concessions in the peace process coming from the Greek Cypriot side uDisregard of international law, European law, and precedent-setting decisions by regional and national courts in proposed “solutions” to the Cyprus problem. Lack of progress in the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General led the leaders of the G-8 on 20 June 1999 to call on the parties to engage in talks on all issues without preconditions and commit to negotiate until a settlement is reached based on full consideration of relevant UN resolutions and treaties. This formula was also endorsed by UN Security Council resolution 1250 of 29 June, 1999. The process, having gone through various stages, culminated in the UN proposal known as the “Annan Plan,” which was submitted to the parties first in November 2002 and subsequently, in its final form (“Annan V”), in March 2004. Issues under discussion since 1974 The Cyprus problem has since 1974 been one of military invasion and continuing occupation in violation of relevant unanimous UN Security Council resolutions. Negotiations, especially after 16 January 2002, aimed at a comprehensive solution for the reunification of Cyprus. Throughout this process, the government of Cyprus sought a solution reflecting democratic norms, the UN Security Council resolutions, international law, European Union law, and relevant court decisions. Specific issues under discussion have included: uImplementation of UN Security Council resolutions and the high level agreements that call for a bizonal, bicommunal federation uNew power sharing formula under a federal government with adequate powers for effective governance, for safeguarding the unity of the Republic, and for meeting its international and EU obligations uContinuation of one Republic with one single sovereignty and international personality and one single citizenship uSafeguards for the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic and the exclusion in whole or in part of union with any other country or any form of partition or secession The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 14

uPolitical equality between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as defined in relevant Security Council resolutions uGuarantees against foreign interference and unilateral right of intervention by another country uWithdrawal of foreign forces under relevant UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions uReturn of displaced persons and a property recovery system in conformity with the European Convention and court decisions uRight to acquire property and reside anywhere in Cyprus without restrictive quotas based on ethnic or religious criteria uFull respect for the human rights of all Cypriots under the European Convention uRepatriation of the illegal settlers to Turkey, except for a limited number based on special humanitarian considerations uCompatibility of any settlement with the obligations and rights of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU uComplete demilitarization of the Cypriot state. UN negotiations, 2002–2004 This period marks the more sustained effort under the good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. All earlier efforts, especially those of 1999–2000, foundered over the Turkish demand for recognition of the illegal “state” in the areas of the Republic occupied by Turkey. The direct talks between President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash which started on 16 January 2002 failed to make substantive progress. In an attempt to secure an agreement by the 12-13 December 2002 Copenhagen EU summit, which would decide on the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented on 11 November 2002 a detailed plan for a comprehensive settlement (Annan I). Following reaction by the parties, the plan was revised on 10 December 2002 (Annan II) and again on 26 February 2003 (Annan III). The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 15

The Secretary-General met with the leaders of the two communities at the Hague on 10 and 11 March 2003 to ascertain whether they were prepared to submit his latest proposal (Annan III) to separate and simultaneous referenda. The newly elected president of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, agreed, provided the Cypriot public was offered a complete legal and political settlement framework for their consideration; Greece and Turkey had reached an agreement on vital security issues; and there was adequate time for discussion and a public campaign prior to the referendum. The Turkish side rejected the proposal of the Secretary- General. In January-February 2003, massive Turkish Cypriot demonstrations took place in the occupied areas against Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and his Ankara supported policies. The Republic of Cyprus, as expected, signed the EU Treaty of Accession on 16 April 2003. On 23 April 2003, under growing public Turkish Cypriot discontent with the situation in occupied Cyprus, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership were compelled to partially lift restrictions, which they had imposed since 1974 along the UN ceasefire line, on the movement of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Since then, thousands of Cypriots have been crossing regularly the ceasefire line. In addition, thousands of Turkish Cypriots cross daily to work in the free areas, to claim passports and other documents issued by the government of Cyprus and to receive free medical care. These peaceful crossings have destroyed the myth cultivated for years by Turkish propaganda that the two communities cannot live together. But these measures are no substitute for a comprehensive settlement. The U.S. government was eager to capitalize on the readiness of the Greek Cypriot side to participate in new negotiations. On the consensus that emerged in meetings with Turkey’s premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Washington, in January 2004, the U.S. administration persuaded Secretary-General Kofi Annan to call for a resumption of negotiations in New York. On 13 February 2004, it was agreed by the parties that negotiations would commence in Nicosia for changes that fell within the parameters of Annan III. In case of continuing deadlock, even after the involvement of Greece and Turkey in the process, the Secretary-General would finalize a text which would then be submitted to the two communities on Cyprus for a vote in separate and simultaneous referenda. This was a significant change in the UN Secretary-General’s mission of good offices as had been conceived since 1964. Without Security Council authorization, the SecretaryThe Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 16

General assumed the power of arbitrator as a precondition for the new round of talks. In accepting this formula, the Greek Cypriots assumed that the Secretariat would maintain its objectivity and commitment to fundamental UN principles. They were proven wrong. By the time of the talks in Switzerland late in March 2004, the Secretariat became a partial party to the dispute by promoting most of Turkey’s positions on the Cyprus problem. The change in the Secretary-General’s role, coupled with extremely tight negotiating deadlines and Turkey’s intransigence, contributed to the absence of serious negotiations both in Nicosia and subsequently in Bürgenstock, Switzerland. In order to gain Turkey’s consent, nearly all of its demands were incorporated arbitrarily in the two plans (Annan IV and V), presented by the Secretary-General. Annan V was presented to the two sides on 31 March 2004. Turkey, the United States and the United Nations agreed to accept the EU presence only on an observer status in the talks, while the EU made the commitment to accommodate the derogations from European law that were included in Annan V. The Secretary-General’s plan was a comprehensive document of nearly 10.000 pages. This complex, legal document was not available in its totality on the UN website until hours before the referendum. Cypriots were called to vote on the document on 24 April 2004, only days before the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU on 1 May. The 24 April 2004 referenda–the people’s decision2 Following a spirited public debate, the Greek Cypriot voters overwhelmingly rejected Annan V, by a vote of 75,8 percent against 24,2 percent. In contrast, 64,9 percent of the Turkish Cypriot voters approved the plan. It should be noted that settlers from Turkey, who had no legal right to vote, were allowed to do so. The Greek Cypriot “no” vote was not a vote against reunification or reconciliation. It was a rejection of a process that led to a one-sided plan perceived harmful to the legitimate rights of the Greek Cypriot community and to the survival of the state of Cyprus itself. It was a rejection of a flawed plan that did not provide for the genuine reunification of Cyprus, its institutions, people, and economy. This negative vote came from Greek Cypriots of all ages, political parties, and gender. 2 See Claire Palley, An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999–2004 (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005). The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 17

uThe positive Turkish Cypriot vote is easy to explain: uRejection of the authoritarian policies of Rauf Denktash uContinuation of the illegal Turkish Cypriot “state” uLegitimization of the status of nearly all illegal settlers from Turkey in the Turkish Cypriot component state uPermanent presence of troops from Turkey on Cyprus uRight of Turkey to intervene in Cyprus Finally, the Turkish Cypriot vote was motivated by the anticipation of substantial economic benefits emanating from the accession of Cyprus to the EU and of expected economic support from the Greek Cypriot community. Various legitimate reasons explain the Greek Cypriot negative vote, including: uRigid negotiating deadlines, no real time for discussion of a most complex legal document, and threats expressed or implied by some of the interlocutors if the Greek Cypriots did not accept the UN plan uMajor derogations from the European Convention of Human Rights depriving all Cypriots of fundamental rights, while other EU nationals residing in Cyprus would enjoy all such rights under the Convention uDissolution of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus and replacement by a loose confederation of two largely autonomous states uQuestionable functionality of the new state in view of the provisions on the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches, and the presence of enhanced minority vetoes. (NonCypriot third parties, unaccountable to the Cypriot public, would cast deciding votes in key policy areas) uConfederal nature of the proposed constitution was reflected in the absence of a provision on the hierarchy of laws. (This carried the risk of jurisdictional conflicts, which would accentuate the divisive nature of the proposed new polity) uAbsence of adequate guarantees to ensure that the commitments undertaken by the parties and particularly Turkey would be carried out The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 18

uEconomic cost of the proposed settlement–convergence, reconstruction, property compensation, compensation to settlers, monetary policy– would be largely borne by the Greek Cypriots. (Turkey, whose military aggression divided the island, was absolved of any financial responsibility for its actions in Cyprus) uSecurity issues involving the gradual reduction and continued presence of Turkish troops with expanded intervention rights even after Turkey joins the EU. (The “United” Cyprus was excluded from the common European defense policy and would be totally demilitarized. Turkey’s proposed guarantees violated the obligation of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states and the respect of the territorial integrity of all states) uIssues of citizenship definition and the fact that nearly all settlers from Turkey would remain in Cyprus uViolations of property rights that are essential rights under the European Convention and overturning of important European Court precedents uExpansion of Britain’s rights in the sovereign base areas and in the Republic’s territorial waters uDeletion of the ratification by the Republic of Cyprus of the 1936 Montreux Treaty (Cyprus is a major maritime power. The plan also granted Turkey near veto rights on the continental shelf of Cyprus) uViolation of the European Convention by denying the right of Cypriots to acquire property and live wherever they chose, as other EU nationals could, without restrictive quotas based on ethnicity and religion. Ultimately, the plan was rejected because it was judged by the great majority of Cypriots not to be the best for the common interest of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. As President Papadopoulos stated at the time, “while all demands by Turkey were adopted in the final Plan on the last day, basic concerns of the Greek Cypriot side were disregarded. All involved in the talks were anxious to bring Turkey on board and ensure a ‘yes’ vote by the Turkish Cypriot community, and ignored the fact that the far bigger Greek Cypriot community also needed to be convinced to vote ‘yes’ on the Plan. Thus, this process failed to address the legitimate concerns, needs, and interests of both sides.” The negative outcome of the referendum rendered the Annan Plan null and void. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 19

Alleged Turkish Cypriot isolation3 Following the rejection of the Annan Plan, Turkey launched a propaganda campaign under the slogans of “easing,”“lifting” or “ending” the alleged “isolation” of Turkish Cypriots, and bridging the “economic disparity” between the two communities on the island. Regrettably, this has led to widespread misinformation, regarding the situation in Cyprus, and to some questionable proposals, ostensibly to improve the economic conditions of Turkish Cypriots. Turkey has even tried to mislead the international community into believing that the government of Cyprus was, somehow, responsible for the predicament of the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey used this approach for two reasons: to divert, in view of its EU aspirations, attention from its ongoing military aggression against Cyprus and to upgrade the illegal regime in the occupied areas of the island. In essence, Ankara has been seeking to secure for the secessionist regime economic attributes of an independent entity with no formal international recognition. This would allow the illegal regime to exist without any incentive for constructive participation in the peace process for the reunification of the island. In their efforts to gain international support for their propaganda, Turkish leaders have adopted, as their main argument, the misleading slogan of “ending the economic isolation” of Turkish Cypriots when, in fact, their goal has been all along political. However, any moves promoting the de facto recognition of the illegal secessionist regime would be in direct violation of international law and UN Security Council resolutions, especially resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). Such moves would also undermine efforts for the country’s reunification, which is the declared position of the UN, the EU, the international community at large, as well as of the two Cypriot communities themselves. The plight of the Turkish Cypriot community has been the direct result of Turkey’s aggression, which keeps Cyprus, its people, institutions and economy divided. It is also the result of misguided policies by Turkish Cypriot leaders, who have consistently promoted Turkey’s interests at the expense of their own community and of Cyprus as a whole. The so-called “isolation” of Turkish Cypriots is very much a self-inflicted wound. It is certainly not the result of any action taken by the government of Cyprus, which has sovereignty over all the territory of the state, including the occupied areas, and which abides by its obligation to defend its sovereign rights and the rule of law. 3 See Miltos Miltiadou, Toward a Unified Cyprus: The Myth of Turkish Cypriot “Isolation,” Fourth Edition (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 2010). The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 20

In response to Turkey’s military aggression, the Republic of Cyprus introduced a number of defensive measures to safeguard its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economy. One of these measures was the declaration of all seaports and airports in the Turkish occupied area of the Republic as illegal. Such measures became necessary, because the government was not able to exercise effective control in the areas of Cyprus under Turkish military control. Under international law, the Republic of Cyprus is the only legal and recognized authority with sole responsibility for air and sea travel, trade, security, safety, and similar issues within its sovereign territory. Similarly, under international law, the regime established by Turkey in occupied Cyprus is illegal and, therefore, all its professed institutions, decisions, and documents have no political or legal validity. As European Courts and the UN Security Council have affirmed, the Turkish Cypriot regime has no legal status in the international community. The European Court of Human Rights has declared this illegal regime as Turkey’s “subordinate local administration”in occupied Cyprus (See Appendix 2). The record clearly shows that the military occupation by Turkey has victimized, albeit in different ways, both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island. Turkey’s continuing occupation is directly responsible for whatever sense of “isolation” Turkish Cypriots may have experienced. In fact, Turkey prevents Turkish Cypriots from realizing their full potential and deprives them of substantial benefits and opportunities they are entitled to as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus and the EU. The government of Cyprus has always been concerned about the economic situation of Turkish Cypriots. It has been better able to provide services to Turkish Cypriots since the partial lifting in 2003 of illegal restrictions, imposed by the Turkish military on the free movement of people across the 1974 UN ceasefire line that extends across the island. Turkish Cypriots have since been able to work, in increasing numbers, in the government-controlled areas earning income estimated at more than 273 million euro so far and to enjoy an expanded range of benefits, including free medical care (See Appendix 1). Only through the reunification of Cyprus can the reintegration of Turkish Cypriots into the international community and the improvement of their political and economic welfare be accomplished legally and comprehensively. Separatist tendencies, under the false banner of “ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots” and other politically motivated schemes promoted by Turkey, do little to enhance the welfare of the Turkish Cypriot community or the peace process. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 21

Instead, such ideas divert attention from Turkey’s continuing aggression against Cyprus and from Ankara’s failure to abide by its obligations to the EU, including the opening of its seaports and airports to ships and aircraft carrying the Cyprus flag. They also inhibit the political will of the Turkish side, thereby undermining initiatives to address the core issue at hand, namely, the solution to the division of Cyprus. Furthermore, they help to solidify the illegal situation created by Turkey in the northern part of Cyprus and to perpetuate the victimization of Turkish Cypriots. Finally, they impede the cause of reconciliation and lasting peace on the island and in the region. Reviving the peace process 2005–2006 Even though the 2002–2004 UN effort did not resolve the Cyprus problem, the referendum was not the end of the road. In fact, the result of the referendum on the Annan Plan must act as a catalyst for reunification and not as a pretext for further division. The Greek Cypriots and the government of the Republic have demonstrated repeatedly that they remain committed to a solution that will provide a prosperous and secure future for all Cypriots and ensure respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms within the EU. Many in the international community were unfamiliar with the detailed provisions of the failed Annan Plan and its implications on the future of the state of Cyprus and its citizens. It was, therefore, not surprising that they expressed disappointment with the outcome of the referendum. What was actually regrettable and disappointing was that the Plan presented to the people did not allow both communities to endorse it. Whereas other parties simply wanted any solution or a closing up of the Cyprus problem as quickly as possible, the Greek Cypriots have always insisted on achieving a comprehensive, functional, and viable settlement. A solution that can withstand the test of time must be perceived as fair by the people who will have to live with it. Thus, no solution can succeed if it does not address the legitimate concerns that prevented the Greek Cypriots from approving the Annan plan in 2004. The fact that Cyprus is a small and weak state makes it even more imperative that all Cypriots enjoy the fundamental rights that all other EU nationals enjoy under European law and the European Convention, and that there is no discrimination based on ethnicity or religion. In order to revive the peace process, President Tassos Papadopoulos exchanged views with the Secretary-General in New York on 16 September 2005 concerning the preparation of a renewed effort on Cyprus by the UN. The Secretary-General also met with Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, on 31 October. In his report to the Security Council on 20 November The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 22

2005, the Secretary-General noted that both leaders and many countries urged him to consider holding new talks in the context of his good offices mission. President Papadopoulos subsequently met with the Secretary-General in Paris, on 28 February 2006, where they reviewed the situation in Cyprus and examined modalities for moving forward on the process leading to the reunification of the island. They also agreed that the resumption of the negotiating process within the framework of the Secretary-General’s good offices must be timely and based on careful preparation. The 8 July 2006 agreement This outcome generated a new momentum for the resumption of the peace process on Cyprus. On July 3, President Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Talat met on the sidelines of a meeting of the Committee on Missing Persons and in the presence of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Cyprus. In addition, the UN Under-Secretary- General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, visited Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus during 3-9 July. Following a joint meeting on 8 July with President Papadopoulos and Mr. Talat, the UN Under-Secretary presented the following “Set of Principles” agreed to by the parties: 1. Commitment to the unification of Cyprus based on a bi-zonal, bi- communal federation and political equality, as set out in the relevant Security Council resolutions. 2. Recognition of the fact that the status quo is unacceptable and that its prolongation would have negative consequences for the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. 3. Commitment to the proposition that a comprehensive settlement is both desirable and possible and should not be further delayed. 4. Agreement to begin a process immediately, involving bi- communal discussion of issues that affect the day to day life of the people and concurrently those that concern substantive issues, both of which will contribute to a comprehensive settlement. 5. Commitment to ensure that the‘right atmosphere’prevails for this process to be successful. In that connection, confidence building measures are essential, both in terms of improving the atmosphere and improving the life of all Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Also in that connection, an end must be put to the so- called ‘blame game.’ In addition, the two leaders decided that Technical Committees on issues that affect day to day life would commence work provided that, at the same time, they would also have exchanged a list of issues of substance, the contents of which would be studied by expert bicommunal working groups and finalized by the leaders. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 23

The 8 July Agreement reaffirmed the Cyprus government’s commitment to reunify the island on the basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federation. On 29 August 2006, the UN Security Council urged the implementation of the 8 July Agreement without further delay and expressed its support for the continued efforts of the Secretary-General to achieve a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus. In order to facilitate the process, on 15 November 2006 the UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs proposed suggestions for the implementation of the 8 July Agreement. Unfortunately, difficulties appeared during the preparatory phase, because the Turkish side questioned the fundamental elements of the Agreement. In a letter to the UN Secretary-General in April 2007, the Turkish Cypriot leader sought to alter the agreed framework of the 8 July Agreement. In his address to the UN General Assembly on 26 September, President Papadopoulos reiterated the commitment of the government to the 8 July Agreement and to a settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation. Noting that the status quo of foreign military occupation and forcible division of the island should not be sustained, the president called for “a meaningful and forward-looking process” to elicit concrete results and a comprehensive solution. He also discussed the need for the acceleration of the implementation of the UN process with UN Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon on 23 September in New York. For the government of Cyprus as well as for the United Nations, the 8 July Agreement procedure became the only way available leading to a mutually acceptable solution. However, its implementation was undermined by the prevarications of the Turkish side. New initiatives in 2008 yield results In February 2008, the new President of the Republic of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, immediately after his election, sought a meeting with the Turkish-Cypriot leader. At their meeting on 21 March 2008, it was decided to set up working groups and technical committees and to draw up a list of issues to be considered. It was decided to hold a new meeting in three months to evaluate the progress in order to enable the start of direct negotiations, under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the UN. At the same time, it was decided to open Ledra Street. On April 3, 2008, the crossing point on Ledras Street was opened, while on April 18, six working groups and seven technical committees launched sessions. In the absence of progress justifying the resumption of negotiations, at the initiative of President Christofias, The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 24

the two leaders met again on 23 May 2008, in the presence of UN Special Representative for Cyprus Taye-Brook Zerihoun. The meeting reaffirmed the commitment to create a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with sole sovereignty, international personality and nationality, and political equality, as described in the resolutions of the Security Council of the UN. It was also agreed to seek the opening of other crossing points. Furthermore, the two leaders agreed to consider confidence-building measures. On the 1st of July 2008, the two leaders revised for the first time the work of the working groups and technical committees. They also discussed the issues of sovereignty and citizenship, on which they agreed, as matters of principle. Details on their implementation would be discussed during the direct talks. In a new meeting on July 25, 2008, it was decided to start direct negotiations on September 3, 2008. The new negotiation process aimed to find a solution "from the Cypriots for the Cypriots" on the basis of an agreement between the two leaders that would receive the approval of the people and which would guarantee all the fundamental and legal rights and interests of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. In joint statements, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a bizonal, bicommunal federation, while agreeing on one sole sovereignty, citizenship, and international personality of the Cyprus federation. Negotiations leading to Crans Montana To emphasize his support for the peace negotiations, the Secretary-General of the United Nations paid a tripartite visit to Cyprus in early 2010. On April 18, 2010, Mehmet Ali Talat was succeeded by Dervis Eroglu as the leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community. President Christofias and the new Turkish Cypriot leader had many unfruitful meetings until July 1, 2012, when Cyprus took over the presidency of the Council of the European Union. Throughout the presidency, the Turkish side refused to enter into talks despite assurances from the President that there was no impediment. On February 11, 2014, the first official meeting of the new President of the Republic of Cyprus Mr. Nikos Anastasiades, and the leader of the Turkish-Cypriots Mr. Dervis Eroglu took place under the auspices of the UN, which set the framework for the new negotiation process and reaffirmed the basic principles of the solution. The launch of a new process of substantive negotiations has renewed international interest, creating new positive momentum for resolving the problem. This was followed by three years of negotiations that led to significant progress. As a result, in June 2017, the UN SecreThe Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 25

tary-General Mr. Antonio Guterres convened a Conference on Cyprus in Crans Montana, Switzerland. The Conference was attended by the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot side with its new leader (since 2015) Mr. Mustafa Akinci, the three guarantor powers Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, and the European Union as an observer. The Conference came to a standstill due to Turkey's insistence on the permanent presence of military troops in Cyprus and on maintaining its invasive rights. Despite this negative development, the Cypriot government remained steadfastly committed to reaching a solution to the Cyprus problem through talks under the auspices of the United Nations. Despite the non-constructive attitude of Turkey, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has appointed Jane Holl Lute as Special Adviser to resume the negotiation process. Successive rounds of contacts led to the meeting of the Secretary-General with the leaders of the two communities on November 25, 2019, in Berlin during which the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to reach a solution based on a bizonal and bicommunal federation with political equality, as defined in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. On 27-29 April 2021, the UN Secretary General convened the informal 5+UN meeting for Cyprus, in Geneva, with the aim to achieve a breakthrough for the resumption of a process of negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Unfortunately, the refusal of Turkey and of the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community to reaffirm their commitment to the agreed basis of a bi-communal bi-communal federation with political equality as defined in UN resolutions, their insistence on the equal status of the "two-states" as a precondition for the resumption of negotiations and their rejection of the Secretary-General's proposal for the appointment of a special envoy, led the effort to a deadlock. In addition, Turkey proceeded with the creation of new faits accomplis in the occupied areas of Cyprus, announcing on 23 July further illegal actions in Varosha in violation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. These actions were condemned by the Security Council which issued a Presidential Declaration on July 23, 2021, calling for the immediate reversal of all illegal actions and for full respect of the relevant UN resolutions including the transfer of Varosha to the administration of the United Nations. These latest provocative actions by Turkey inevitably impact on the efforts of the UN Secretary General and the international community to create a conducive environment for the resumption of meaningful negotiations. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 26

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