The Cyprus Question

a brief introduction TheCyprus Question

Editorial supervision: Press and Information Office Sixth edition updates: Press and Information Office Original text: Van Coufoudakis, Miltos Miltiadou The sale or other commercial exploitation of this publication or part of it is strictly prohibited. Excerpts from the publicationmay be reproduced with appropriate acknowledgment of this publication as the source of the material used. Press and Information Office publications are available free of charge.

Si x th edition 2022 a brief introduction TheCyprus Question

The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction Contents FOREWORD 13 INTRODUCTION 15 POLITICAL OVERVIEW 17 Seeking a negotiated solution 17 Issues under discussion since 1974 18 UN negotiations, 2002–2004 19 The 24 April 2004 referenda–the people’s decision 21 Alleged Turkish Cypriot isolation 24 Reviving the peace process 2005–2006 26 The 8th July 2006 agreements 27 New initiatives in 2008 yield results 28 Negotiations leading to Crans Montana 29 Cyprus and the European Union 31 Conclusion 34 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 35 From Independence to the Turkish invasion, 1960–1974 35 Turkish military invasion and occupation 38 Our vision for a reunified Cyprus 41 MAPS 42 APPENDICES 45 1. Policy initiatives for Turkish Cypriots 45 2. Important legal decisions on the Cyprus question 47 3. Consequences of the Turkish invasion and occupation - facts and figures 52 CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS 54 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 61


The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 5 … if the purpose of a settlement of the Cyprus question is to be the preservation rather than the destruction of the state and if it is to foster rather than to militate against the development of a peacefully united people, I cannot help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from the majority should not be considered a desperate step in the wrong direction.” Dr Galo Plaza, Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General, UN Security Council S/6253, 26 March 1965. We are all prisoners of knowledge. To know how Cyprus was betrayed, and to have studied the record of that betrayal, is to make oneself unhappy and to spoil, perhaps for ever, one’s pleasure in visiting one of the world’s most enchanting islands. Nothing will ever restore the looted treasures, the bereaved families, the plundered villages and the groves and hillsides scalded with napalm. Nor will anything mitigate the record of the callous and crude politicians who regarded Cyprus as something on which to scribble their inane and conceited designs. But fatalism would be the worst betrayal of all. The acceptance, the legitimization of what was done–those things must be repudiated. Such a refusal has a value beyond Cyprus, in showing that acquiescence in injustice is not ‘realism’. Once the injustice has been set down and described, and called by its right name, acquiescence in it becomes impossible. That is why one writes about Cyprus in sorrow but more–much more–in anger.” Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger (London and NewYork: Verso, 1997). “ “

The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 6 By now it is no longer possible for violene and injustice to stifle a whole people in secret, without protest. Apparently, this world we thought had gone rotten, still has spirits that dare to rear their head against hypocricy, injustice, arrogance. It is a critical moment. The moral salvation of the whole world depends on the answer given to the Cyprus question. And on this moral salvation the political, social, cultural salvation of the world has always depended. Cyprus is no longer a detail now, a mere island at the extreme tip of the Mediterranean. It is becoming the fate-marked center, where the moral value of contemporary man is at stake. […] There is some mystic law in this world (for if there were not, this world would have been destroyed thousands of years ago), a harsh inviolable law: in the beginning, evil always triumphs, and in the end it is always vanquished. […] For us this is a good moment to forget our passions and our petty cares; for each man of us with his own God-given gifts to follow the path of freedom throughout the land of Cyprus. And we must share her grief, her upsurge, her danger, insofar as we are capable, and surely later on (for this is the law, we said) her great joy as well.” Nikos Kazantzakis, “The Angels of Cyprus,” as it appeared as an Epilogue in his book England: A Travel Journal (NewYork: Simon and Shuster, 1965) The political-demographic de facto partition imposed on Cyprus since 1974 thus threatens not only the unity and integrity of a modern nation- state but also the millennial cultural integrity and continuity of the island which has been the crossroads of the civilization of the eastern Mediterranean.” Michael Jansen,“Cyprus: The Loss of a Cultural Heritage,”(ModernGreek Studies Yearbook, 2 (1986):314-323. “ “

The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 7 Excerpts from the Statement by the President of the Republic of Cyprus Mr. Nicos Anastasiades, at the 76th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, in NewYork, on 24 September 2021 I stand here before you representing a country which, regrettably, still endures the consequences of the blatant violation of the fundamental principles of the United Nations, as a result of the 1974 illegal military invasion of Turkey and the ongoing occupation. Ever since, both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council, have issued numerous decisions and resolutions, calling on Turkey to end the illegal occupation and withdraw its occupying troops, establishing at the same time the basis for reaching a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. Decisions and resolutions which – in the absence of resolve and the necessary means for the implementation thereof – have led to the audacity of the invader who tries to be portrayed as a victim, instead of the perpetrator it actually is. It is not my intention to engage on a blame game, but I cannot leave unnoticed the absurdity of the Turkish rhetoric, which lies in their claim that the efforts for a compromise have been exhausted and the focus should now be on reaching a settlement based on the so-called “realities on the ground”. Let me remind you what the true realities on the ground are: 1. Is it not a fact that 37 per cent of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, an EU member-state, remains under Turkish military occupation, with more than forty thousand troops still on the ground? 2. Is it not a fact that after the Turkish invasion of 1974, one third of the Greek Cypriots were forced to leave their ancestral homes? 3. Is not a fact that, while the Turkish Cypriots owned approximately 14 per cent of the privately owned land, today they usurp 37 per cent of the island? 4. Is it not a fact that they looted churches, destroyed archeological sites and thousands of years of cultural heritage? 5. Is it not a fact that they have killed thousands of people and embarked on all kind of atrocities and still today almost one thousand persons are missing?

6. Is it not a fact that they have implanted hundreds of thousands of Turkish nationals to the occupied areas, thus altering the demographic character of the island - turning the Turkish Cypriots into minority in the areas they occupy? 7. Is it not a fact that they have never implemented the 1975 Agreement on the status of the enclaved persons, then more than twenty – three thousand, while today they number only three hundred and fifty? 8. Is it not a fact that all the above crimes have been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights and the Council of Europe in a plethora of decisions, with Turkey failing to comply with even one ruling? 9. Is it not a fact that Turkey has established an illegal entity in the occupied areas, which is under its absolute political, economic, societal, cultural and religious control? A control which is also denounced by the majority of Turkish Cypriots? An illegal entity described by the European Court of Human Rights as “a subordinate local administration” of Turkey? 10. Is it not a fact that Turkey tries to equate the State, the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus – member of the United Nations and the European Union – with the illegal secessionist entity? 11. Is it not a fact that the above proclamation of the purported secession had been condemned by the Security Council and considered legally invalid? 12. And is not a fact that the Security Council called for its reversal and for all states and the international community as a whole, not to accept it or in any way assist it? 13. Is not a fact that recently with the presence of President Erdogan in Cyprus they are trying to change the status of the fenced – city of Famagusta, contrary to the UN Council Resolutions and the condemnation of the international community? The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 8 During his address at the GeneralAssembly on Tuesday, the President of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan, stated, and I quote: “We hope that the problems regarding maritime boundary delimitation will be resolved within the framework of international law and good neighbourly relations”. I wonder as to which international law Mr. Erdogan refers to.

Is it not a fact that Turkey refuses to abide by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which codifies relevant customary international law? How Mr. Erdogan understands the settlement of disputes concerning delimitations? Is he referring to Turkey’s own arbitrary interpretation of international law which reduces the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus by 44%, at the expense of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots? President Erdogan also spoke of the need of maintaining good neighbourly relations. And I wonder, yet again: Which country had invaded and to date still occupies Cyprus? Which country invaded Syria? Which country violates the sovereignty of Iraq? Which country intervenes in the internal affairs of Libya? Which country violates the sovereign rights of Greece? Which country interfered in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? The narrative also put forward by the Turkish side, according to which all efforts to reaching a compromise have failed and we should seek solutions outside the UN framework, reinforces the valid arguments that Turkey’s end game is not to solve the Cyprus Problem, but to turn Cyprus into its protectorate. And I will elaborate. In his report of 28 September 2017, about the outcome of the Conference on Cyprus at Crans Montana, in paragraph 27 the UN Secretary General correctly assessed that all internal elements included in his six - point framework were almost, or about to be solved. Thus, whilst the aim of the Secretary General to reach a strategic agreement was within close reach, the reason of the unsuccessful outcome was Turkey’s inflexible stance and insistence on maintaining the anachronistic Treaty of Guarantee, the right of intervention and a permanent presence of troops. Furthermore, following the Conference at Crans Montana, in line with our commitment to resume the peace - process, both leaders – I, myself and the Turkish Cypriot leader – and the UN Secretary General reached a Joint Understanding on November 25, 2019 as to the principles which should guide the resumption of a new round of negotiations, namely: The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 9

l The Joint Declaration of 2014, l Convergences reached so far, and, l The six-point framework presented by the UN Secretary General at Crans Montana. Following the above, one would expect the next step to be the resumption of the negotiations. Nevertheless, with Turkish objectives being different, we witnessed blatant interventions of Turkey to oust the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, with whom the above Joint Understanding was reached. The evident goal was for him to be replaced by a new leadership which reproduces and adopts Turkey’s position for changing the agreed basis for a settlement, with the ultimate goal being a two-state solution. Thus, it is clear why a compromise is not possible to reach when one side deviates from the UN framework or annuls agreements reached and aspires to a different form of settlement, contrary to the agreed basis and the good offices mandate of the Secretary General. Part of the Turkish agenda is also the creation of new faits accomplish on the ground in Famagusta, in full contravention and violation of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, and in particular 550 and 789. All such actions are clearly intended to destroy the prospects of a settlement based on the agreed UN framework. A compromise becomes even more difficult to reach when new ideas put forward by our side, as asked by the Secretary General and in an effort to move the process forward, are blatantly rejected. I have proposed the decentralization of the exercise of powers, which we deem as the appropriate balance between the enhancement of the constituent states’ essential role and the unhindered functioning of the state, including at international level. I have also flagged our willingness to consider the option of a parliamentary system with a ceremonial head of state and rotating Prime Minister. And more recently, I have even extended an invitation to the Turkish Cypriots to rejoin the state institutions established by the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, thus, fully implementing, mutatis mutandis, its relevant provisions. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 10

It goes without saying that such an invitation is not meant to be an alternative to the agreed basis of the settlement. It is meant to ease the Turkish Cypriot community back into the State pending a final settlement, provided a strategic agreement is reached, thus, fully participating in the evolution of the Republic of Cyprus into a Federal State. This proposal should also be assessed in conjunction with the package of game changing, win – win, Confidence Building Measures I proposed last December and which were unfortunately rejected by the Turkish side. These Confidence Building Measures are still on the table. What I would like to assure you about my determination to set the negotiation process back on track, on the basis of the UN framework and the agreement reached in Berlin on November 25, 2019. For us, there is only one Plan: To reach a settlement on the basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as set out in relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded. A settlement that will lead to a functional and viable State, without the obsolete System of Guarantees, the right of intervention, the presence of Turkish troops, or any kind of foreign dependencies. A settlement that will equally benefit all Cypriots, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, fully respecting their human rights and contributing to the peace and stability of the region. My extensive reference to the Cyprus problem, dear Friends, aims at highlighting the need to address the realities and issues before us, on the basis of values and principles of international law, and not on the basis of the law arbitrarily interpreted by the powerful. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 11


Foreword In July 1974 Turkey invaded the Republic of Cyprus. This was in violation of the UN Charter and of fundamental principles of international law. The consequences of the military invasion and subsequent occupation of nearly forty percent of the sovereign territory of the Republic are still felt today. For almost five decades, Turkey’s aggression has continued unabated. With it came military occupation, forcible division, population displacement, ethnic segregation, massive violation of human rights, colonization, attempted secession, cultural destruction, and property usurpation. These conditions, imposed by Turkey, constitute an unacceptable situation that has persisted on the island since 1974. In his address at the official affirmation at the House of Representatives on 28 February 2018, President Nicos Anastasiades emphasized that: “I consider as the highest priority, no other than addressing the unacceptable current state of affairs, with the continuing Turkish occupation of 37% of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. A situation that, unfortunately, worsens as a result of the attempt to create new faits accomplis, with the violation by Turkey of the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus, in its Exclusive Economic Zone. (…) I want to repeat what I have made clear to the UN Secretary-General, that if Turkey's unlawful actions are lifted and any unacceptable claims made by the Turkish Cypriots are withdrawn, I am ready to engage in a new dialogue on the internal aspects and participate in a new Cyprus conference, providing that it will have been properly prepared and that the five permanent members of the Security Council and the EU will actively participate in it.” Today, Turkey, an aspiring member of the European Union, still stands guilty of international aggression against Cyprus, a member-state of the Union. The status quo of foreign military occupation and forcible division of an independent, sovereign state must be redressed by the international community. This informational booklet, updated for the present edition, is intended to introduce the reader to basic aspects of a major international issue, the Cyprus Question or Cyprus Problem, as it is commonly referred to, and to the prospects for a viable settlement in line with European norms and the rule of law. It is a brief guide to a protracted and seemingly intractable conflict that provides background information to help place the current situation and new developments in proper historical perspective. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 13

The more recent phase of the Cyprus problem, as it has developed since 1974, is dealt with in the first section, “Political Overview,” while the “Historical Background” to the issue is covered in the subsequent section of the booklet. The appendices and the chronology of key events that follow provide useful information relevant to the main text. The short, select bibliography, indicative of the vast literature on the Cyprus problem, can provide the interested reader with both a better understanding of and further guidance to an international issue that has engaged the international community for decades. It is important to keep in mind that throughout the text, the terms “Turkish Cypriots” and “Turkish Cypriot community,” refer specifically and exclusively to the legal, indigenous, native Cypriot citizens of the Republic of Cyprus that are of Turkish ethnic background. These terms do not refer to and definitely exclude the tens of thousands of illegal settlers imported from Turkey into occupied Cyprus after 1974. The influx of these settlers, who have entered and remain illegally on the island, has been part of Ankara’s systematic effort to change the demographic structure of the Republic of Cyprus. More information on the various dimensions of the Cyprus problem can be found on the website and in numerous publications of the Press and Information Office (PIO). The PIO website is a convenient, comprehensive venue to current developments, background information, and useful links to other relevant sources. The reader is urged to explore this valuable resource for a more thorough understanding of the issues discussed in this booklet. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 14

Introduction Cyprus became an independent sovereign state in August 1960. Unfortunately, since the invasion and continuing military occupation by Turkey in 1974, the island republic remains forcibly divided. The dire consequences of this invasion, occupation and forcible division have been systematic violations of human rights, massive colonization of areas under occupation, property usurpation, the destruction of cultural heritage and ethnic separation. The Cyprus question remains unresolved, an affront to the international legal order, and a threat to regional stability. Turkey’s actions have been condemned by unanimous UN Security Council resolutions, UN General Assembly resolutions1, international court decisions, and decisions by other major international and regional organizations. Regrettably, most of these resolutions and decisions remain unimplemented. As a result, the Republic of Cyprus is the only country in Europe since the end of the Cold War that remains forcibly divided because of foreign military occupation. On 1May 2004, the Republic of Cyprus joined the EuropeanUnionwithout achieving the desired goal of accession as a unified country. The government and people of Cyprus, however, remain committed to a viable settlement that would allow the genuine, peaceful, and secure reunification of their country, in conformity with European norms. Only then will all Cypriots be able to benefit fully from EUmembership. On 24 April 2004, the Greek Cypriot community overwhelmingly rejected a proposal submitted by the UN Secretary-General for the settlement of the Cyprus problembecause it did not provide for a genuine reunification of Cyprus, its society, economy, and institutions. However, the government and the Greek Cypriot community remain firmly committed to the Secretary-General’s mission of good offices and for a sustained peace process that will facilitate a viable, comprehensive settlement by the two communities themselves. 1 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006 (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 2006). The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 15

President Anastasiades reiterated that commitment in his address to the people of Cyprus on the occasion of the 61st Anniversary of the Independence of the Republic of Cyprus on October 2021: “In continuing the efforts of my predecessors, from the moment I assumed my duties, I strived in every possible way and making use of all available possibilities, to reverse the present situation and achieve the reunification of our homeland. To achieve a solution that will not leave behind winners or losers, that will respect the concerns and special characteristics of both communities, that will protect the fundamental freedoms, and will honour the human rights of all Cypriot citizens. A solution that will be based on the High-Level Agreements, the United Nations resolutions, and the principles and values of the European Union. A solution that will not dissolve the Republic of Cyprus but through its evolution will lead to a federal system of governance, beyond anachronistic systems of guarantees or any form of dependence on third parties. In order to avoid painful experiences of the past, what we seek out is the safeguarding of the functionality of the state which will guarantee an enduring and creative future for all legal citizens of the Republic of Cyprus.” The president steadfastly clarified on many occasions that the settlement sought would be a definite one: “There is no doubt that lasting peace and stability can only be achieved through the definite solution of the Cyprus problem. A solution that will be characterized by mutual respect, which will aim at achieving an agreement that will not legitimize the fait accompli of the violation of international law, that will not disregard the human rights of the whole people, that will not ignore the fact that Cyprus is a member state of the European Union and, therefore, has an obligation to respect the European acquis.” The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 16

Political Overview Seeking a negotiated solution FollowingTurkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the Turkish side demanded a solution that would keep the two communities apart, either as two separate sovereign states or two separate states under a loose confederation. The two communities agreed in 1977 and 1979 to reunite Cyprus under a bicommunal, federal republic, the parameters of which had evolved through the years. For the Greek Cypriots, who had strongly advocated the concept of a unitary state, the acceptance of a bizonal, bicommunal federation was the ultimate concession and historic compromise in their effort to terminate Turkey’s military occupation and achieve the reunification of Cyprus. The UN-led peace process has since 1977 sought to define the framework of such a federal solution. Negotiations have sought to reconcile the interests and concerns of the two sides under a common central government. Issues of definitions of objectives andways to implement a comprehensive federal settlement became serious problems mainly because of the intransigence of Turkey, the occupying power, which holds the key to a final settlement and should be pressured to adopt a constructive attitude toward the peace effort. UN Security Council resolution 367 of 12March 1975 reactivated the Secretary-General’smission of good offices, which had been interrupted in 1974. Since then, intermittent negotiations under UN auspices have taken place. There have been high level meetings between successive presidents of the Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot leaders, proximity talks, proposals for confidence building measures, and various plans by UN and other foreign emissaries. All these actions have failed to resolve the Cyprus problem for a number of reasons, including: uFailure to implement UN Security Council resolutions uPrevalence of third-party strategic, economic, and political considerations over a viable and functional solution that satisfies the concerns of the state of Cyprus and of all Cypriots uIntransigent policies of successive governments in Turkey who claimed that the Cyprus problemwas “solved” in 1974 The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 17

uPolitical conditions in the Turkish Cypriot community and insistence by Turkish leaders on the recognition of the so-called “TRNC” uAll major concessions in the peace process coming from the Greek Cypriot side uDisregard of international law, European law, and precedent-setting decisions by regional and national courts in proposed “solutions” to the Cyprus problem. Lack of progress in the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General led the leaders of the G-8 on 20 June 1999 to call on the parties to engage in talks on all issues without preconditions and commit to negotiate until a settlement is reached based on full consideration of relevant UN resolutions and treaties. This formula was also endorsed by UN Security Council resolution 1250 of 29 June, 1999. The process, having gone through various stages, culminated in the UN proposal known as the “Annan Plan,” which was submitted to the parties first in November 2002 and subsequently, in its final form (“Annan V”), in March 2004. Issues under discussion since 1974 The Cyprus problem has since 1974 been one of military invasion and continuing occupation in violation of relevant unanimous UN Security Council resolutions. Negotiations, especially after 16 January 2002, aimed at a comprehensive solution for the reunification of Cyprus. Throughout this process, the government of Cyprus sought a solution reflecting democratic norms, the UN Security Council resolutions, international law, European Union law, and relevant court decisions. Specific issues under discussion have included: uImplementation of UN Security Council resolutions and the high level agreements that call for a bizonal, bicommunal federation uNew power sharing formula under a federal government with adequate powers for effective governance, for safeguarding the unity of the Republic, and for meeting its international and EU obligations uContinuation of one Republic with one single sovereignty and international personality and one single citizenship uSafeguards for the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic and the exclusion in whole or in part of union with any other country or any form of partition or secession The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 18

uPolitical equality between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as defined in relevant Security Council resolutions uGuarantees against foreign interference and unilateral right of intervention by another country uWithdrawal of foreign forces under relevant UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions uReturn of displaced persons and a property recovery system in conformity with the European Convention and court decisions uRight to acquire property and reside anywhere in Cyprus without restrictive quotas based on ethnic or religious criteria uFull respect for the human rights of all Cypriots under the European Convention uRepatriation of the illegal settlers to Turkey, except for a limited number based on special humanitarian considerations uCompatibility of any settlement with the obligations and rights of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU uComplete demilitarization of the Cypriot state. UN negotiations, 2002–2004 This period marks the more sustained effort under the good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. All earlier efforts, especially those of 1999–2000, foundered over the Turkish demand for recognition of the illegal “state” in the areas of the Republic occupied by Turkey. The direct talks between President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash which started on 16 January 2002 failed to make substantive progress. In an attempt to secure an agreement by the 12-13 December 2002 Copenhagen EU summit, which would decide on the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented on 11 November 2002 a detailed plan for a comprehensive settlement (Annan I). Following reaction by the parties, the plan was revised on 10 December 2002 (Annan II) and again on 26 February 2003 (Annan III). The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 19

The Secretary-General met with the leaders of the two communities at the Hague on 10 and 11 March 2003 to ascertain whether they were prepared to submit his latest proposal (Annan III) to separate and simultaneous referenda. The newly elected president of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, agreed, provided the Cypriot public was offered a complete legal and political settlement framework for their consideration; Greece and Turkey had reached an agreement on vital security issues; and there was adequate time for discussion and a public campaign prior to the referendum. The Turkish side rejected the proposal of the Secretary- General. In January-February 2003, massive Turkish Cypriot demonstrations took place in the occupied areas against Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and his Ankara supported policies. The Republic of Cyprus, as expected, signed the EU Treaty of Accession on 16 April 2003. On 23 April 2003, under growing public Turkish Cypriot discontent with the situation in occupied Cyprus, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership were compelled to partially lift restrictions, which they had imposed since 1974 along the UN ceasefire line, on the movement of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Since then, thousands of Cypriots have been crossing regularly the ceasefire line. In addition, thousands of Turkish Cypriots cross daily to work in the free areas, to claim passports and other documents issued by the government of Cyprus and to receive free medical care. These peaceful crossings have destroyed the myth cultivated for years by Turkish propaganda that the two communities cannot live together. But these measures are no substitute for a comprehensive settlement. The U.S. government was eager to capitalize on the readiness of the Greek Cypriot side to participate in new negotiations. On the consensus that emerged in meetings with Turkey’s premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Washington, in January 2004, the U.S. administration persuaded Secretary-General Kofi Annan to call for a resumption of negotiations in New York. On 13 February 2004, it was agreed by the parties that negotiations would commence in Nicosia for changes that fell within the parameters of Annan III. In case of continuing deadlock, even after the involvement of Greece and Turkey in the process, the Secretary-General would finalize a text which would then be submitted to the two communities on Cyprus for a vote in separate and simultaneous referenda. This was a significant change in the UN Secretary-General’s mission of good offices as had been conceived since 1964. Without Security Council authorization, the SecretaryThe Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 20

General assumed the power of arbitrator as a precondition for the new round of talks. In accepting this formula, the Greek Cypriots assumed that the Secretariat would maintain its objectivity and commitment to fundamental UN principles. They were proven wrong. By the time of the talks in Switzerland late in March 2004, the Secretariat became a partial party to the dispute by promoting most of Turkey’s positions on the Cyprus problem. The change in the Secretary-General’s role, coupled with extremely tight negotiating deadlines and Turkey’s intransigence, contributed to the absence of serious negotiations both in Nicosia and subsequently in Bürgenstock, Switzerland. In order to gain Turkey’s consent, nearly all of its demands were incorporated arbitrarily in the two plans (Annan IV and V), presented by the Secretary-General. Annan V was presented to the two sides on 31 March 2004. Turkey, the United States and the United Nations agreed to accept the EU presence only on an observer status in the talks, while the EU made the commitment to accommodate the derogations from European law that were included in Annan V. The Secretary-General’s plan was a comprehensive document of nearly 10.000 pages. This complex, legal document was not available in its totality on the UN website until hours before the referendum. Cypriots were called to vote on the document on 24 April 2004, only days before the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU on 1 May. The 24 April 2004 referenda–the people’s decision2 Following a spirited public debate, the Greek Cypriot voters overwhelmingly rejected Annan V, by a vote of 75,8 percent against 24,2 percent. In contrast, 64,9 percent of the Turkish Cypriot voters approved the plan. It should be noted that settlers from Turkey, who had no legal right to vote, were allowed to do so. The Greek Cypriot “no” vote was not a vote against reunification or reconciliation. It was a rejection of a process that led to a one-sided plan perceived harmful to the legitimate rights of the Greek Cypriot community and to the survival of the state of Cyprus itself. It was a rejection of a flawed plan that did not provide for the genuine reunification of Cyprus, its institutions, people, and economy. This negative vote came from Greek Cypriots of all ages, political parties, and gender. 2 See Claire Palley, An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999–2004 (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005). The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 21

uThe positive Turkish Cypriot vote is easy to explain: uRejection of the authoritarian policies of Rauf Denktash uContinuation of the illegal Turkish Cypriot “state” uLegitimization of the status of nearly all illegal settlers from Turkey in the Turkish Cypriot component state uPermanent presence of troops fromTurkey on Cyprus uRight of Turkey to intervene in Cyprus Finally, the Turkish Cypriot vote was motivated by the anticipation of substantial economic benefits emanating from the accession of Cyprus to the EU and of expected economic support from the Greek Cypriot community. Various legitimate reasons explain the Greek Cypriot negative vote, including: uRigid negotiating deadlines, no real time for discussion of a most complex legal document, and threats expressed or implied by some of the interlocutors if the Greek Cypriots did not accept the UN plan uMajor derogations from the European Convention of Human Rights depriving all Cypriots of fundamental rights, while other EU nationals residing in Cyprus would enjoy all such rights under the Convention uDissolution of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus and replacement by a loose confederation of two largely autonomous states uQuestionable functionality of the new state in view of the provisions on the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches, and the presence of enhanced minority vetoes. (NonCypriot third parties, unaccountable to the Cypriot public, would cast deciding votes in key policy areas) uConfederal nature of the proposed constitution was reflected in the absence of a provision on the hierarchy of laws. (This carried the risk of jurisdictional conflicts, whichwould accentuate the divisive nature of the proposed new polity) uAbsence of adequate guarantees to ensure that the commitments undertaken by the parties and particularly Turkey would be carried out The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 22

uEconomic cost of the proposed settlement–convergence, reconstruction, property compensation, compensation to settlers, monetary policy– would be largely borne by the Greek Cypriots. (Turkey, whose military aggression divided the island, was absolved of any financial responsibility for its actions in Cyprus) uSecurity issues involving the gradual reduction and continued presence of Turkish troops with expanded intervention rights even after Turkey joins the EU. (The “United” Cyprus was excluded from the common European defense policy and would be totally demilitarized. Turkey’s proposed guarantees violated the obligation of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states and the respect of the territorial integrity of all states) uIssues of citizenship definition and the fact that nearly all settlers from Turkey would remain in Cyprus uViolations of property rights that are essential rights under the European Convention and overturning of important European Court precedents uExpansion of Britain’s rights in the sovereign base areas and in the Republic’s territorial waters uDeletion of the ratification by the Republic of Cyprus of the 1936Montreux Treaty (Cyprus is a major maritime power. The plan also grantedTurkey near veto rights on the continental shelf of Cyprus) uViolation of the European Convention by denying the right of Cypriots to acquire property and live wherever they chose, as other EU nationals could, without restrictive quotas based on ethnicity and religion. Ultimately, the plan was rejected because it was judged by the great majority of Cypriots not to be the best for the common interest of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. As President Papadopoulos stated at the time, “while all demands by Turkey were adopted in the final Plan on the last day, basic concerns of the Greek Cypriot side were disregarded. All involved in the talks were anxious to bring Turkey on board and ensure a ‘yes’ vote by the Turkish Cypriot community, and ignored the fact that the far bigger Greek Cypriot community also needed to be convinced to vote ‘yes’ on the Plan. Thus, this process failed to address the legitimate concerns, needs, and interests of both sides.” The negative outcome of the referendum rendered the Annan Plan null and void. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 23

Alleged Turkish Cypriot isolation3 Following the rejection of the Annan Plan, Turkey launched a propaganda campaign under the slogans of “easing,”“lifting” or “ending” the alleged “isolation” of Turkish Cypriots, and bridging the “economic disparity” between the two communities on the island. Regrettably, this has led towidespreadmisinformation, regarding the situation in Cyprus, and to some questionable proposals, ostensibly to improve the economic conditions of Turkish Cypriots. Turkey has even tried tomislead the international community into believing that the government of Cyprus was, somehow, responsible for the predicament of the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey used this approach for two reasons: to divert, in viewof its EU aspirations, attention from its ongoingmilitary aggression against Cyprus and to upgrade the illegal regime in the occupied areas of the island. In essence, Ankara has been seeking to secure for the secessionist regime economic attributes of an independent entity with no formal international recognition. This would allow the illegal regime to exist without any incentive for constructive participation in the peace process for the reunification of the island. In their efforts to gain international support for their propaganda, Turkish leaders have adopted, as their main argument, the misleading slogan of “ending the economic isolation”of Turkish Cypriots when, in fact, their goal has been all along political. However, anymoves promoting the de facto recognition of the illegal secessionist regimewould be in direct violation of international law and UN Security Council resolutions, especially resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). Such moves would also undermine efforts for the country’s reunification, which is the declared position of the UN, the EU, the international community at large, as well as of the two Cypriot communities themselves. The plight of the Turkish Cypriot community has been the direct result of Turkey’s aggression, which keeps Cyprus, its people, institutions and economy divided. It is also the result ofmisguided policies by Turkish Cypriot leaders, who have consistently promoted Turkey’s interests at the expense of their own community and of Cyprus as a whole. The so-called “isolation” of Turkish Cypriots is very much a self-inflicted wound. It is certainly not the result of any action taken by the government of Cyprus, which has sovereignty over all the territory of the state, including the occupied areas, and which abides by its obligation to defend its sovereign rights and the rule of law. 3 See Miltos Miltiadou, Toward a Unified Cyprus: TheMyth of Turkish Cypriot “Isolation,” Fourth Edition (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 2010). The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 24

In response to Turkey’s military aggression, the Republic of Cyprus introduced a number of defensivemeasures to safeguard its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economy. One of these measures was the declaration of all seaports and airports in the Turkish occupied area of the Republic as illegal. Such measures became necessary, because the government was not able to exercise effective control in the areas of Cyprus under Turkish military control. Under international law, the Republic of Cyprus is the only legal and recognized authority with sole responsibility for air and sea travel, trade, security, safety, and similar issues within its sovereign territory. Similarly, under international law, the regime established by Turkey in occupied Cyprus is illegal and, therefore, all its professed institutions, decisions, and documents have no political or legal validity. As European Courts and the UN Security Council have affirmed, the Turkish Cypriot regime has no legal status in the international community. The European Court of Human Rights has declared this illegal regime as Turkey’s “subordinate local administration” in occupied Cyprus (See Appendix 2). The record clearly shows that the military occupation by Turkey has victimized, albeit in different ways, both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island. Turkey’s continuing occupation is directly responsible for whatever sense of “isolation” Turkish Cypriots may have experienced. In fact, Turkey prevents Turkish Cypriots from realizing their full potential and deprives them of substantial benefits and opportunities they are entitled to as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus and the EU. The government of Cyprus has always been concerned about the economic situation of Turkish Cypriots. It has been better able to provide services to Turkish Cypriots since the partial lifting in 2003 of illegal restrictions, imposed by the Turkish military on the free movement of people across the 1974 UN ceasefire line that extends across the island. Turkish Cypriots have since been able to work, in increasing numbers, in the government-controlled areas earning income estimated at more than 273 million euro so far and to enjoy an expanded range of benefits, including free medical care (See Appendix 1). Only through the reunification of Cyprus can the reintegration of Turkish Cypriots into the international community and the improvement of their political and economic welfare be accomplished legally and comprehensively. Separatist tendencies, under the false banner of “ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots” and other politically motivated schemes promoted by Turkey, do little to enhance the welfare of the Turkish Cypriot community or the peace process. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 25

Instead, such ideas divert attention fromTurkey’s continuing aggression against Cyprus and from Ankara’s failure to abide by its obligations to the EU, including the opening of its seaports and airports to ships and aircraft carrying the Cyprus flag. They also inhibit the political will of the Turkish side, thereby undermining initiatives to address the core issue at hand, namely, the solution to the division of Cyprus. Furthermore, they help to solidify the illegal situation created by Turkey in the northern part of Cyprus and to perpetuate the victimization of Turkish Cypriots. Finally, they impede the cause of reconciliation and lasting peace on the island and in the region. Reviving the peace process 2005–2006 Even though the 2002–2004 UN effort did not resolve the Cyprus problem, the referendum was not the end of the road. In fact, the result of the referendum on the Annan Plan must act as a catalyst for reunification and not as a pretext for further division. The Greek Cypriots and the government of the Republic have demonstrated repeatedly that they remain committed to a solution that will provide a prosperous and secure future for all Cypriots and ensure respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms within the EU. Many in the international community were unfamiliar with the detailed provisions of the failed Annan Plan and its implications on the future of the state of Cyprus and its citizens. It was, therefore, not surprising that they expressed disappointment with the outcome of the referendum. What was actually regrettable and disappointing was that the Plan presented to the people did not allowboth communities to endorse it.Whereas other parties simply wanted any solution or a closing up of the Cyprus problem as quickly as possible, the Greek Cypriots have always insisted on achieving a comprehensive, functional, and viable settlement. A solution that can withstand the test of time must be perceived as fair by the people who will have to live with it. Thus, no solution can succeed if it does not address the legitimate concerns that prevented the Greek Cypriots from approving the Annan plan in 2004. The fact that Cyprus is a small and weak state makes it even more imperative that all Cypriots enjoy the fundamental rights that all other EU nationals enjoy under European law and the European Convention, and that there is no discrimination based on ethnicity or religion. In order to revive the peace process, President Tassos Papadopoulos exchanged views with the Secretary-General in New York on 16 September 2005 concerning the preparation of a renewed effort on Cyprus by the UN. The Secretary-General also met with Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, on 31 October. In his report to the Security Council on 20 November The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 26

2005, the Secretary-General noted that both leaders and many countries urged him to consider holding new talks in the context of his good offices mission. President Papadopoulos subsequently met with the Secretary-General in Paris, on 28 February 2006, where they reviewed the situation in Cyprus and examined modalities for moving forward on the process leading to the reunification of the island. They also agreed that the resumption of the negotiating process within the framework of the Secretary-General’s good offices must be timely and based on careful preparation. The 8 July 2006 agreement This outcome generated a newmomentum for the resumption of the peace process on Cyprus. On July 3, President Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Talat met on the sidelines of a meeting of the Committee onMissing Persons and in the presence of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Cyprus. In addition, the UN Under-Secretary- General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, visited Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus during 3-9 July. Following a joint meeting on 8 Julywith President Papadopoulos andMr. Talat, the UNUnder-Secretary presented the following“Set of Principles”agreed to by the parties: 1. Commitment to the unification of Cyprus based on a bi-zonal, bi- communal federation and political equality, as set out in the relevant Security Council resolutions. 2. Recognition of the fact that the status quo is unacceptable and that its prolongation would have negative consequences for the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. 3. Commitment to the proposition that a comprehensive settlement is both desirable and possible and should not be further delayed. 4. Agreement to begin a process immediately, involving bi- communal discussion of issues that affect the day to day life of the people and concurrently those that concern substantive issues, both of which will contribute to a comprehensive settlement. 5. Commitment to ensure that the‘right atmosphere’prevails for this process to be successful. In that connection, confidence building measures are essential, both in terms of improving the atmosphere and improving the life of all Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Also in that connection, an end must be put to the so- called ‘blame game.’ In addition, the two leaders decided that Technical Committees on issues that affect day to day life would commence work provided that, at the same time, they would also have exchanged a list of issues of substance, the contents of which would be studied by expert bicommunal working groups and finalized by the leaders. The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 27

The 8 July Agreement reaffirmed the Cyprus government’s commitment to reunify the island on the basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federation. On 29 August 2006, the UN Security Council urged the implementation of the 8 July Agreement without further delay and expressed its support for the continued efforts of the Secretary-General to achieve a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus. In order to facilitate the process, on 15 November 2006 the UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs proposed suggestions for the implementation of the 8 July Agreement. Unfortunately, difficulties appeared during the preparatory phase, because the Turkish side questioned the fundamental elements of the Agreement. In a letter to the UN Secretary-General in April 2007, the Turkish Cypriot leader sought to alter the agreed framework of the 8 July Agreement. In his address to the UNGeneral Assembly on 26 September, President Papadopoulos reiterated the commitment of the government to the 8 July Agreement and to a settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation. Noting that the status quo of foreign military occupation and forcible division of the island should not be sustained, the president called for “a meaningful and forward-looking process” to elicit concrete results and a comprehensive solution. He also discussed the need for the acceleration of the implementation of the UN process with UN Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon on 23 September in NewYork. For the government of Cyprus as well as for the United Nations, the 8 July Agreement procedure became the only way available leading to a mutually acceptable solution. However, its implementation was undermined by the prevarications of the Turkish side. New initiatives in 2008 yield results In February 2008, the new President of the Republic of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, immediately after his election, sought a meeting with the Turkish-Cypriot leader. At their meeting on 21 March 2008, it was decided to set up working groups and technical committees and to draw up a list of issues to be considered. It was decided to hold a new meeting in three months to evaluate the progress in order to enable the start of direct negotiations, under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the UN. At the same time, it was decided to open Ledra Street. On April 3, 2008, the crossing point on Ledras Street was opened, while on April 18, six working groups and seven technical committees launched sessions. In the absence of progress justifying the resumption of negotiations, at the initiative of President Christofias, The Cyprus Question| A brief Introduction 28